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I. INTRODUCTION
The world is currently engaged in an anti-corruption cam-
paign, particularly against political corruption and transnational
bribery. This trend is fueled by the fact that international, politi-
cal, and economical organizations understand that corruption
reduces growth, restricts trade, and increases poverty. The World
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regard
corruption as a major obstacle to achieving sustainable economic
growth and equitable development.' However, there is no precise
definition of corruption. The World Bank defines corruption as
"the exercise of public power for private gain[,]"' while the IMF
understands corruption as "the abuse of public authority or trust
for private benefit."3 On the other hand, to Transparency Interna-
tional, a corruption fighting non-governmental organization, cor-
ruption is defined as "the misuse of entrusted power for private
gain. '
1. The World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
stressed the need for good governance and transparency as parts of their programs to
foster sound economic frameworks and encourage stable economies. These
institutions assert that poor governance can affect private market confidence and
reduce private capital inflows and investment, retarding economic growth in
developing countries. See generally The World Bank, www.worldbank.org (last visited
Apr. 5, 2007); International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org (last visited Apr. 5,
2007).
2. Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for
1996-2002 (World Bank Pol. Res., Working Paper No. 3106, 2003), available at http:/
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html; see also Vito Tanzi,
Corruption Around the World, Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, 45 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 559 (1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/FT/staffp/1998/12-
98/pdf/tanzi.pdf.
3. IMF, A FACTSHEET: THE IMF AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/exr/facts/gov.htm.
4. Transparency International Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption,
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Members of international political organizations have demon-
strated interest in preventing and combating corruption by adopt-
ing international anti-corruption treaties. In 1997, the United
Nations (UN) adopted the Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC), 5 which condemns public and private sector corruption.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Cor-
ruption Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions,6 which criminalizes any bribery of
foreign public officials to obtain or retain international business
deals. Furthermore, the African Union (AU) adopted its own Con-
vention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, which also
combats public and private sector corruption.7
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC)s
was the first international anti-corruption convention in the
world. The IACAC represents regional consensus regarding the
prevention, criminalization, and investigation of corruption acts
in the public sector,9 and establishes a legal framework to facili-
tate cooperation among its members (State Parties) for purposes
of investigation and recovery of assets. Four years after the
IACAC became effective, the Follow-up Mechanism on Implemen-
http://www.transparency.org/news-room/faq/corruption-faq (last visited Apr. 13,
2007).
5. United Nations Convention Against Corruption [UNCAC], U.N. GAOR, 58th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/
crime/convention-corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf. For a list of signatories to the
UNCAC, see http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention-corruption/cosp/sessionl/
COSP1.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
6. The Org. for Econ. & Coop. for Dev. [OECD], Information Sheet on the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Feb. 15, 1999, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/
24/2406452.pdf. For a list of the countries that have ratified the IACAC, see http:l
www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_34859_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Apr. 3, 2007).
7. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted
at Maputo, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 1, http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/
DocumentslTreaties/Text/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf. For a
list of the countries that have signed and ratified the convention, see http://www.
africa-union.org/Official-documents/Treaties-%20Conventions_%20Protocols/List/
African%20Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2007).
8. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 27, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724,
available at http:/www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html [hereinafter
IACAC].
9. The Organization of American States (OAS) is composed of thirty-four State
Parties without Cuba, which has been excluded since 1962 from participating in the
OAS. From all the active OAS Members, only Barbados has not ratified the IACAC.
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tation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption"
(Follow-up Mechanism) was created to monitor the implementa-
tion of measures adopted by IACAC signatories. To date, the Fol-
low-up Mechanism has reviewed twenty-eight State Parties."
The objective of this article is to determine whether the
IACAC has impacted corruption perception and risk levels. In
order to reach that purpose, a comparative analysis among four
countries will be made - two from Central America and two from
the Caribbean. The selected countries are Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. These countries were chosen
because of shared characteristics including population, area, and
the fact that all have implemented the terms of the IACAC to
some extent. Three independent indexes that measure corruption
will be used to examine change, using the ratification date and the
date of major implementing measures as the explanatory variable.
The indexes applied are the Transparency International's Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI), 2 the World Bank's Governance
Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS), 3 and the PRS
Group's International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).4
The first two indexes serve to compare corruption perception
from 1996 to 2004, and the third determines changes in corruption
risk levels over the last decade. These corruption measures are
based on a subjective analysis of the problem. The indexes do not
reflect the actual degree of corruption in a country given that gov-
ernments do not systematically report corruption in the public
sector. CPI and GRICS measure the perception of corruption
using the assessments from various data sources. 5 ICGR assesses
risk of corruption to the extent that it is viewed as a factor that
10. OAS, Follow-up Mechanism on Implementation of the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, AG/RES. 1784 (XXXII-O/02) (June 5, 2001), available
at http://www.oas.org/Assembly200l/documentsE/Decl-Resol.aprv/ag-RES 1784XXXI-
O-01.htm [hereinafter OAS Follow-up Mechanism].
11. The Committee of Experts issues a country report for each examined country.
With consent of the examined country, the country report is made pubic though the
OAS Follow-up Mechanism's official website at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
mec-ronl-rep.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
12. Transparency International (TI) releases the Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) annually and requires at least three available sources to rank a country in the
index. The 2006 CPI is available at http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/
surveys indices/global/cpi (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 2006 CPI].
13. See Kaufmann, supra note 2 (presenting six governance indicators for 199
countries and territories over four time periods between 1996-2002).
14. The PRS Group assesses corruption as a component of political risk. See
generally PRS Group, http://www.prsgroup.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
15. 2006 CPI, supra note 12.
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causes business underperformance. 16
Because Honduras and Trinidad & Tobago ratified the IACAC
three years before Guatemala and Jamaica, this article antici-
pated to find an improvement in corruption perception and risk
levels in those countries before any progress occurred in the latter
two. However, the data reflects that ratification date as an
explanatory variable does not affect corruption perception or cor-
ruption risk levels (dependent variables). Thus, ratification date
does not necessarily generate a change in perception within the
ratifying state. This finding is consistent with the view that inter-
national treaties must be implemented to create change.17 For
that reason, implementation of national legislation was used as
the explanatory variable, as opposed to ratification date, expecting
a positive change in perception and risk levels in the four
countries.
Nevertheless, the same result is observed for corruption per-
ception. Implementing national legislation did not reflect improve-
ment in corruption perception as a dependent variable in any of
the four countries. This last result was not expected, as positive
changes are intuitively expected when ratification is followed by
implementing national legislation to comply with the terms of the
IACAC. This explanatory variable has influenced a positive
change in corruption risk level as a dependent variable for one
country (Honduras). This positive finding is explained by the fact
that Honduras has made the most far-reaching changes in its
institutional and legal system among the countries examined.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Part II
reviews the serious negative consequences of corruption. Part III
discusses the provisions and nature of the obligations of the
IACAC and its Follow-up Mechanism. Part IV explains the differ-
ence between the concepts of compliance, implementation, and
effectiveness of international treaties. Part V describes the mea-
sures adopted by the four countries to implement the terms of the
IACAC. This section is divided into four subparts corresponding
to Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. Part
VI contains a comparative analysis of the chosen countries using
16. STUART POOLE-ROBB & ALAN BAILEY, RISKY BUSINESS: CORRUPTION, FRAUD,
TERRORISM AND OTHER THREATS TO GLOBAL BUSINESS 14 (2002) (stating that risk is an
important factor in business and investor decision making, and high levels of
corruption risk can undermine the success or further the failure of a business).
17. DAVID G. VICTOR ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-2 (David G.
Victor et al. eds., 1998).
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subjective perception indexes and describes the specific causes of
corruption in the four countries.
Part VII presents findings and proposes recommendations to
strengthen the IACAC's Follow-up Mechanism and to build
enforcement networks to achieve the IACAC's objectives. Part
VIII concludes the paper by observing that the ratification date of
the IACAC and implementation measures do not seem to be stim-
ulating any modification in corruption perception. An integrated
strategy by both national and international actors is needed to
spur a positive change in corruption perception. A strengthened
Follow-up Mechanism and better national enforcement institu-
tions are important components of an integrated anti-corruption
strategy to prevent and fight corrupt practices.
II. THE PROBLEM: NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF CORRUPTION
Every country criminalizes corruption and every culture and
religion heavily discourages corruption. 8 Nonetheless, increase in
international trade, foreign investment, and technological growth
has created opportunities to spread corruption.19 Corruption is
not a result of globalization,20 but rather caused by weak political,
judicial, and administrative institutions.2  Opportunities to
engage in corrupt practices increase when government officials
18. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of
Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 277-278 (1999) ("The myth
that bribery is acceptable in some cultures finds no empirical support .... Every
major religion or school of thought, including Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism,
Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and Taoism, specifically condemns bribery."); see
also Alhaji B.M. Marong, Toward a Normative Consensus Against Corruption: Legal
Effects of the Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
99, 105 (2002).
19. Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business,
The Dawn of a New Era, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 349, 355 (2000) (expressing that
research by TI supports the view that corruption is increasing in recent times); see
also Nichols, supra note 18, at 262; Marong, supra note 18, at 105.
20. Saladin Al-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on
Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 198 (1999) (arguing that
corruption has roots in colonial administration of developing countries); see also Luz
Estella Nagle, Latin America: Views on Contemporary Issues in the Region the
Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin America, 26 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1649, 1692 (2003) (asserting that corruption in Latin American has "pervaded
political ambition for many generations"); JOHANN GAF LAMBSDORFF ET AL., THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 2 (2005); Nichols, supra note 18, at 272
(describing globalization as economic and commercial integration in stating that
"bribery as a phenomenon is as old as bureaucratic systems argues that bribery is a
phenomenon").
21. Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries, 18
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 524, 525 (1998).
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have high discretionary power distributing goods, services, or
other assets valued by the private sector.22 The opposite is true
when decision-making is transparent and when there is an impar-
tial judicial system.2"
When rules are unclear, enforcement institutions are weak,
and government officials are not held accountable, corruption
becomes pervasive, embedding itself in all aspects of governmen-
tal decision-making processes.24 Economic and political literature
has presented empirical evidence that corruption is a large inter-
national problem that negatively impacts economies, government
machinery, and political processes.2" Experts have also argued
that corruption is a threat to international peace because it ham-
pers economic development and destroys confidence in
governments.26
A. Negative Impact on the Economy
Empirical studies have confirmed that there is an inverse
relationship between levels of corruption, foreign investment,27
22. Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, 35 FIN. &
DEV. 3, 4 (Mar. 1998) (suggesting the equation: C = M + D - A (Corruption Equals
Monopoly Plus Discretion Minus Accountability)); see also Al-Jurf, supra note 20, at
198 (explaining that the state in Latin America has wide discretion in the economic
sphere, allowing the government the ability to seize and halt private resources and to
redistribute a country's based on arbitrary political policies); Marong, supra note 18,
at 103 (arguing that administrative discretion of officials increase the likelihood of
corruption).
23. Paolo Mauro, Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further
Research, 35 FIN. & DEV. 11 (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter Mauro, Agenda for Further
Research] (asserting that corruption is most prevalent where there are political
instability, bureaucratic red tape, and weak legislative and judicial systems); see also
Al-Jurf, supra note 20, at 199 (arguing that a legal system and the judiciary that
functions under government control create opportunities and incentives for engaging
in corrupt activities).
24. Marong, supra note 18, at 104 (arguing that developing countries need
responsible and accountable government to fight corruption and contribute to
economic development).
25. Sanjeev Gupta et al., Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?
(IMF, Working Paper No. 98/76, May 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=882360; see also Nichols, supra note 18, at 275; Al-Jurf, supra
note 20, at 195 ("[T]he World Bank and the IMF have identified corruption as the
major barrier to sustainable economic growth and development.").
26. Elliott, supra note 21, at 524.
27. Mauro, Agenda for Further Research, supra note 23, at 12 (expressing that
regression analysis shows that a country that improves its standing on the corruption
index two points will experience a four percentage point increase in its investment
rate and a 0.5 percentage point increase in its annual per capita GDP growth rate).
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and economic growth.2 8 Corruption has a significant negative
effect on investment flow as the level of uncertainty in the busi-
ness environment affects investment. Corruption also affects
private market confidence and reduces economic growth by affect-
ing investment flows.3 0 Thus, investment tends to decrease when
high levels of corruption are present and tend to increase when
the level of corruption is low.' Moreover, political instability due
to a high level of corruption hampers economic growth.3 2 Eco-
nomic studies find that a one-unit increase in the corruption index
reduces growth rate by approximately 0.545 percentage points.3
Furthermore, even if government officials manage to attract
public investment, public corruption will distort economic deci-
sion-making, which increases uncertainty and distrust for future
investment.3 4 In a corrupt transaction, misallocation of govern-
ment resources will hamper economic growth. Evidence suggests
that corruption reduces growth by increasing public investment
while reducing its productivity.35 New investment will be with-
drawn when productivity expectations are not met because past
investments have been misdirected or misused. As a direct conse-
quence, infrastructure is directly damaged because investment
money will not be used for maintenance or any other intended
purpose. Therefore, corruption also reduces economic growth by
lowering the quality of the existing infrastructure,36 which
28. Pak Hung Mo, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. CoMP. ECON. 66, 76
(2001).
29. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 704 (1995).
30. See generally The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note, http:l/
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlexrp/govern/govern.pdf, at 7 (approved by the IMF
Executive Board on July 25, 1997).
31. Mauro, Corruption and Growth, supra note 29, at 12.
32. Mo, supra note 28, at 70, 76 (stating political instability is measured by the
average of the number of assassinations per million population per year and the
number of revolutions per year over the period).
33. Id. at 76 (utilizing the 1980-1985 CPI and the University Goettingen Indexes
as measures of corruption levels).
34. Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth 4-9
(IMF, Working Paper No. 97/139, Oct. 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97139.pdf; see also Elliott, supra note 21, at 524.
35. See Tanzi & Davoodi, supra note 34, at 7.
36. C6sar Calder6n & Luis Serv6n, The Effects of Infrastructure Development on
Growth and Income Distribution 27 (World Bank Pol. Res., Working Paper No. WPS
3400, Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ifw-kiel.de/VRCent/DEGIT/paper/degit_10/
C010_-056.pdf (providing an empirical evaluation of one-hundred countries over forty
years (1960-2000) on the quality and quantity of infrastructure, transportation,
power, and telecommunications, and to a less degree water infrastructure). This
working paper concluded that infrastructure quantity and quality raises economic
growth and lowers income inequality. See id.
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increases the cost of doing business, a factor that is almost guar-
anteed to scare away investors.37
In addition, transaction costs are greater in corrupt markets
than in ordinary ones. 8 Investment is reduced because of the high
cost of bribes. 9 Investors view bribery as a private tax on their
investment.4" They "tend to shy away from jurisdictions with high
rates of 'private taxation.' ' 41 Corrupt government officials will
always reward the highest bidder, causing the competition to offer
more money and creating a non-fixed private tax for investors. 2
Once a price (bribe) has been set, it may become inflexible even if
the market conditions change. 43 Therefore, if an investor wants
efficient service from a corrupt official, he or she must pay
whatever "tax" is demanded.
Finally, a non-independent judiciary that is not willing to
uphold the rule of law increases the risk for investors. If the judi-
ciary is corrupt, contracts will not be equally enforced and prop-
erty rights will not be respected.44  Corrupt judges and
government officials, in general, are usually protected by lax legal
systems, thus creating a corruption-prone cycle that causes dis-
trust and instability. This situation is also not attractive for
investors. The rule of law and an independent judiciary are essen-
tial to foster an investor-friendly environment. Moreover, corrup-
tion that lowers institutional quality, such as the quality of
contract enforcement and property rights, is a significant detri-
ment to trade flows. 45 Ineffective institutions increase transaction
37. Mauro, Agenda for Further Research, supra note 23, at 12.
38. LAMBSDORFF, supra note 20, at 153.
39. In other words, bribery increases the transaction costs of doing business in
particular jurisdictions. The effect has been lower inflows of foreign investment to
countries with high rates of corruption. See Marong, supra note 18, at 107.
40. With respect to its effects on the economy, there is evidence that investors
view bribery as a private tax on their investment, and tend to shy away from
jurisdictions with high rates of "private taxation." Id.
41. Id.
42. Al-Jurf, supra note 20, at 201-02.
43. Id. at 202 (expressing that when prices for bribes or fees become known to the
members of the business community, the prices may not adjust properly to changing
market conditions).
44. Omar Azfar et al., The Annals of The American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 573 ANNALs 42, 47 n.6 (2001).
45. Andrei A. Levchenko, Institutional Quality and International Trade (IMF,
Working Paper No. 04/231, Dec. 2004), available at http://alevchenko.com/Levchenko_
imfwp04231.pdf; see also Henri L.F. de Groot et al., The Institutional Determinants of
Bilateral Trade Pattern (Tinbergen Inst., Discussion Paper No. 03-044/3, 2003),
available at http://www.ersa.org/ersaconfs/ersa03/cdrom/papers/421.pdf; James E.
Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical
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costs and reduce trade.46 Countries with better institutional qual-
ity tend to have larger trade volumes, gaining more from interna-
tional trade.
Conversely, corruption decreases growth in gross domestic
products and development, in part, by causing reduction of assis-
tance for development projects.41 Mistrust among the donor com-
munity is created when development funds are misdirected and
not used for the purposes intended.49 Experience demonstrates
that corruption takes place as a diversion of public funds from
development assistance.5 0 Therefore, the donor community denies
or conditions development assistance until anti-corruption mea-
sures are adopted.51
The negative effects of corruption on investment, develop-
ment aid, and trade intensify poverty.52 Corruption is directly
associated with an increase in income inequality, which has
expanded in countries with high levels of corruption. Low eco-
Investigation, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 342, 351 (2002) (arguing that corrupt
transactions generate a hidden tax or tariff to trade, increasing transactions costs and
reducing international trade).
46. Henri L.F.M. de Groot et al., Why do OECD-Countries Trade More? 9
(Tinbergen Inst., Discussion Paper No. 03-092/3, 2003), available at http://www.
tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/03092.pdf (arguing that differences in institution
effectiveness offer an explanation for the tendency of OECD countries to trade more
between each other, than with non-OECD countries).
47. Levchenko, supra note 45, at 4.
48. Mauro, Corruption and Growth, supra note 29, at 705-706 (finding a close
correlation between corruption and economic growth in all regions of the world); see
also Paolo Mauro, The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth, 51 IMF
STAFF PAPERS 1, 15-17 (2004), http://www.imf.org/ExternaVPubs/FT/staffp/2004/01/
pdf/mauro.pdf.
49. Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Fighting International Corruption &
Bribery in the 21st Century, Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption,
Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
731, 757 (2000) ("[C]orruption leads to improper construction of infrastructure, in
which is easily destroyed in the event of a natural disaster. For example, Hurricane
Mitch, which hit Honduras ... and other Central American countries ... resulted in
widespread death and destruction out of proportion . . . [partly because]
infrastructure . . . had not been adequately constructed, due largely to corruption.
Disaster relief funds 'poured into' the region, while no significant progress was made
with reconstruction."); see also A1-Jurf, supra note 20, at 196 (stating that corruption
leads to the diversion of funds making developing nations suffer in the areas of
education, health care and infrastructure advancement).
50. Marong, supra note 18, at 109.
51. Elliott, supra note 21, at 530 (expressing how the IMF suspended lending
money to Kenya until anti-corruption reforms were adopted).
52. Se-Jik Kim & Yong Jim Kim, Growth Gains from Trade and Education 25
(IMF, Working Paper No. 99/23, Mar. 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9923.pdf (arguing that in the long term, international trade and
education can contribute to growth).
2007] CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
nomic growth leads to unequal distribution of assets and increases
ineffectiveness of social spending.53 Low growth rates and income
disparity are directly linked with deterioration in living condi-
tions,54 affecting health, mortality rates, quality of education, and
environmental quality.55 Moreover, higher corruption is associ-
ated with lower government revenues, which translates into fewer
funds for development projects. Corruption reduces official gov-
ernment revenue, while increasing private revenues to public offi-
cials.56 It lowers the tax base by allowing potential taxpayers to
offer bribes to avoid the responsibility of paying taxes. Further-
more, a quantity of taxes paid by taxpayers is diverted to benefit
the administrator.57 Equally, it is associated with the unofficial
economy, which avoids tax responsibilities entirely.58
B. Negative Impact on the Government's Machinery
Corruption undermines the effectiveness of government's
administration by creating an environment where bribes are
expected and demanded. In a corrupt environment, if bribes are
not offered or provided, government officials will not perform their
jobs effectively. Moreover, pervasive corruption tends to attract
dishonest and ineffective bureaucrats by inviting civil servants to
abuse their positions to seek economic benefit through corrupt
practices.59 This causes a vicious cycle that focuses on concealing
corrupt practices and facilitating their occurrence. Furthermore,
corruption may affect the very administrative systems that are
required to regulate and eliminate it. 0
53. Gupta, supra note 25, at 29-30.
54. SANJAY PRADHAM ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION: A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLICY DEBATE 20 (2002), available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governancepdf/contribution.pdf [hereinafter ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION]
("Corruption undermines the social safety net and may deter the poor from seeking
basic entitlements and other public services.").
55. Nichols, supra note 18, at 276.
56. Roberta Gatti, Corruption and Trade Tariffs or a Case for Uniform Tariffs
(The World Bank Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. 2216, Nov. 1999), available at
http://www.worldbank.orgwbi/governance/pubs/wps2216.html (arguing for uniform
tariffs on import goods to deliver higher revenues and welfare to the country, because
these factors are lost in the interaction between importers and corrupt custom
officials).
57. Tanzi & Davoodi, supra note 34, at 9.
58. Wallace-Bruce, supra note 19, at 357 (arguing that bribery for the purpose of
accelerating government procedures avoid taxes, as well as other charges that would
otherwise have applied to overall government revenue).
59. Id. at 277.
60. Nichols, supra note 18, at 283 ("A study ofjudicial reform in Latin America...
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C. Negative Impacts on the Political Process
In the same way that corruption reduces the quality of insti-
tutions and hampers economic growth, it also destroys confidence
in the democratic processes. Corruption undermines the demo-
cratic processes by creating mistrust in government officials.61
Skepticism about the democratic system festers once the citizen-
ship has a fixed perception that their leaders are driven by per-
sonal interest in their public functions. A recent study on Latin
America by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
indicates that the majority of the population is frustrated with
democratically elected governments and is losing faith in the dem-
ocratic process. Indeed, 54.7% of the people surveyed expressed
that they would support an authoritarian government if such a
system would resolve social and economic problems. 2 More than
56% preferred economic development to democracy. 3
Corruption is injuring democratic progress in Latin America
by destroying confidence in governments and hampering economic
progress.' Corruption also fosters a crime-tolerant environment.
"Pervasive corruption that undermines economic development and
political stability can also be a threat to international peace and
prosperity, as well as facilitating drug-trafficking, money launder-
ing" and weapon smuggling.65 Moreover, in Latin America "cor-
ruption has opened the door to international criminal
syndicalism."
66
Drug traffickers provide a source of personal enrichment to
corrupt officials, who facilitate the operations of organized crimi-
nal organizations. For example, Jamaica is known to be a major
transit point for cocaine traveling to the United States and
found that factors related to corruption in the court system contributed to political
inertia in dealing with corruption and bribery.").
61. Windsor & Getz, supra note 49, at 757 ("The immediate effects of corruption
include the destruction of democratic institutions.); see also Nichols, supra note 18, at
279; Patricio Maldonado & Gerardo D. Berthin, Transparency and Developing Legal
Frameworks to Combat Corruption in Latin America, 10 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 243,
244 (2004).
62. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM [UNDP], DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA: TOWARDS A CITIZENS' DEMOCRACY 131 (2004), available at http:ll
democracia.undp.org/Informe/Default.asp.
63. Id. at 133.
64. Id. at 137.
65. Elliott, supra note 21, at 524.
66. Nagle, supra note 20, at 1659.
67. Id. at 1678 ("Organized crime would not be nearly as lucrative an enterprise
were it not for the culpability and willingness of government officials and corporate
executives in organized criminal activities for personal gain.").
498
2007] CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 499
Europe, and is the largest Caribbean producer and exporter of
cannabis.68 Cocaine, heroin, and other illicit narcotics are also
transported to the United States and Europe through Guate-
mala.69 According to the U.S. Department of State, narcotics-
related corruption in Jamaica undermines law enforcement and
judicial efforts against drug-related crimes," and in Guatemala,
this corruption is considered as the largest single obstacle to the
overall efficiency of anti-narcotics programs.7
III. THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST
CORRUPTION (IACAC) AND ITS
FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM
A. The Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption
The IACAC was the first multilateral instrument to establish
a comprehensive legal framework aimed at combating corruption
of government officials by criminalizing domestic and transna-
tional bribery. 2 The Organization of American States (OAS)
adopted the IACAC on March 29, 1996,11 and it became effective in
March 1997 with the deposit of the second instrument of ratifica-
tion in accordance with Article XXV of the Treaty.74 As of 2005,
the IACAC was ratified by 33 of the 34 active members of the OAS
(State Party).7"
68. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
2003: THE CARIBBEAN (Mar. 2004), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt2003/voll/
html/29834.htm [hereinafter THE CARIBBEAN REPORT].
69. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
2003: CANADA, MEXICO, AND CENTRAL AMERICA (Mar. 2004), http://www.state.gov/p/
inl/rls/nrcrpt2003/voll/html/29833.htm [hereinafter CANADA, MEXICO & CENTRAL
AMERICA REPORT].
70. THE CARIBBEAN REPORT, supra note 68.
71. CANADA, MEXICO & CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, supra note 69.
72. Nancy Boswell, The Impact of International Law on Domestic Governance, 97
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 133, 133-34 (2003); see also Wallace-Bruce, supra note 19, at
366.
73. IACAC, supra note 8.
74. The IACAC became effective with ratification from Paraguay and Bolivia.
IACAC Article XXV states: "This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth
day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each
State ratifying or acceding to the IACAC after the deposit of the second instrument of
ratification, the IACAC shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such
State of its instrument of ratification or accession." Id. at 734.
75. Status of ratification can be found on the OAS official website at http:/www.
oas.org/juridico/englishlSigs/b-58.html (last visited Apr. 03, 2007). Cuba was
excluded from participating in the OAS in 1962 and is no longer an active member.
See OAS, Final Act of the Eight Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
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The OAS members, by participating and promoting the adop-
tion of this first regional instrument in 1996, took a leadership
role in the international fight against corruption. 6 The IACAC
attacks corruption in the performance of public functions and acts
of corruption related to such performance.77 Its objective is two-
fold: first, it attempts to provide guidance to State Parties for the
establishment of mechanisms that can eradicate corruption; sec-
ond, it promotes cooperation among State Parties to enforce mech-
anisms that would eradicate corruption in the hemisphere.78
The IACAC reaches officials at all levels of hierarchy in gov-
ernment bureaucracy. 79 It does not, however, include any provi-
sion regarding party officials or candidates to public offices and
funding to political parties."0 The IACAC extends criminal juris-
diction based on territoriality and nationality principles.8 ' Extra-
territorial jurisdiction based on the nationality principle is
reflected because State Parties are required to extend jurisdiction
to offenses committed by their nationals or residents, even if they
were not committed inside their territory. 2 However, as discussed
infra, the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not
mandatory as it only applies to transnational bribery. It is impor-
tant to note that the IACAC leaves the imposition of penalties for
corrupt offenses and the criminalization of other corrupt activities
in Punta del Este, Paraguay, OEA/Ser.C/II.8 (Jan. 22-31, 1962), available at http:ll
www.oas.org/columbus/docs/OEAsercii.8eng.pdf.
76. Claudio Grossman, The Experts Roundtable: A Hemispheric Approach to
Combating Corruption, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 759, 770 (2000).
77. The IACAC is composed of a preamble and twenty-eight articles. The basic
structure of the IACAC includes domestic obligations (Articles III-IX and XI) and
actions that require cooperation and assistance among the member (Articles X, XIII-
XVI, XVIII, and XX). Articles I, II, IV-VI, XII, and XVII deal with definitions,
purposes, scope of the IACAC, jurisdiction, acts of corruption, effect on state property,
and nature of the act. Articles XIX, XXI, and XXII-XXVIII deal with temporal
application, signature, ratification, accession, reservations, entry into force,
denunciation, additional protocols, and deposit of original instrument. See generally
IACAC, supra note 8.
78. Peter D. Maynard, The Law Against Corruption and Money Laundering in the
Caribbean with Special Reference to the Bahamas, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
627, 629 (1998); see also IACAC, supra note 8, art. II.
79. Article I defines the terms "public function," "public official," "government
official," "public servant," and "property." See IACAC, supra note 8, art. I.
80. The IACAC does not include regulate political parties funding. However, the
UN Convention requires State Parties to "enhance transparency in the funding of
candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political
parties." See UNCAC, supra note 5, art. 7, para. 3; see also Homer Moyer, The Role of
Law in Combating Official Corruption, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 169, 177 (2004).
81. IACAC, supra note 8, art. V.
82. Id. art. V, para. 2.
500
2007] CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 501
to the discretion of the State Parties. The latter approach could
be a weakness because penalties can range from monetary awards
to serving time in prison.
Moreover, the IACAC contains different levels of obligation.' 8
Some provisions are compulsory, while others are aspirational.85
For example, Article VI, the most important provision of the
IACAC, is mandatory."' Article VI specifies all acts of corruption
that fall within the IACAC's scope. While Article VI does not pro-
vide a specific definition of corruption, it does list a number of
"acts of corruption" that must be criminalized. s7 Article VI con-
demns both active and passive bribery,8 but limits its reach to
corrupt practices by public officials within the State Party's terri-
torial boundary. 9 Article VI has a broad scope because it places
legal responsibility on principal actors, co-participators, instiga-
tors (aiding or abetting),9" accomplices or accessories after the
fact.9
83. Id. art. V, para. 4.
84. Grossman, supra note 76, at 771; see also Edmundo Vargas Carreflo, The
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, IADB (2000), at 9, available at http:l
www.iadb.org/leg/seminar/Documents/corrupcin%20Carreo%2OEng.pdf (prepared for
the Conference on Transparency and Development in Latin America and the
Caribbean).
85. Grossman, supra note 76, at 771-74.
86. Carrefio, supra note 84, at 12.
87. IACAC, supra note 8, art. VI.
88. Passive bribery refers to the demand side of corruption, when public officials
abuse their office to achieve private gain. Active bribery is understood as the supply
side of the equation, applying to private parties who offer bribes to government
officials in return for benefits. Article VI, a mandatory provision of the IACAC
condemns passive and active bribery. See JACAC, supra note 8, art. VI (stating that
passive bribery is "[tihe solicitation or acceptance . . . by a government official or a
person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary value or other
benefit.... [Whereas active bribery is] [tihe offering or granting... to a government
official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary value, or
other benefit .... ); see also Frank Vogl, The Supply Side of Global Bribery, 35 FIN. &
DEV. 2 (June 1998), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/06/
vogl.htm.
89. Grossman, supra note 76, at 771.
90. Nagle, supra note 20, at 1672.
91. Article VI of the IACAC provides: "1. This Convention is applicable to the
following acts of corruption: a. The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by
a government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for
himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions; b. The offering or granting, directly or indirectly,
to a government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for
himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions; c. Any act or omission in the discharge of his
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The "acts of corruption" list is not exhaustive because it con-
tains a broad clause that allows members to criminalize other cor-
rupt related practices through mutual assistance agreements.
Furthermore, Articles VIII (Transnational Bribery), IX (Illicit
Enrichment), and XI (Progressive Development), discussed infra,
provide other "acts of corruption" that could be considered offenses
in State Parties. These articles are not mandatory, however, as
State Parties are not required to criminalize such acts as
offenses.92
The IACAC emphasizes cooperation among State Parties to
fulfill its anti-corruption goals in evidence gathering, extradition,
seizure of assets, and bank secrecy.9" In this regard, the most
important provisions are Articles XIV, XV and XVI, which are
mandatory. Article XIV requires members to provide mutual
assistance and technical cooperation in preventive, investigative,
and enforcement efforts, according to their domestic laws.94 Arti-
cle XV is dedicated to furnishing assistance among members for
asset recovery.9 5 Article XV is general and brief,96 but asset recov-
ery has the potential to become a powerful incentive for members
to fully implement the terms of the IACAC and carry out its objec-
tive of eradicating corruption in the hemisphere.97 Lastly, Article
XVI sets prohibiting bank secrecy as its rationale for denying
information or assistance to a requesting State Party.9" The
duties by a government official or a person who performs public functions for the
purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party; d. The fraudulent
use or concealment of property derived from any of the acts referred to in this article;
and e. Participation as a principal, co-principal, instigator, accomplice or accessory
after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission or attempted commission of,
or in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit, any of the acts referred to in this
article. 2. This Convention shall also be applicable by mutual agreement between or
among two or more States Parties with respect to any other act of corruption not
described herein." JACAC, supra note 8, art. VI.
92. Carrefio, supra note 84, at 10.
93. Article XVIII of the IACAC requires State Parties to designate a Central
Authority that will be responsible for processing requests for assistance and
cooperation, and facilitating communication between themselves. Article XIII
(Extradition) creates a framework to enhance cooperation by being the legal basis for
extradition and allowing acts of corruption to be included in any existing or future
extradition treaties. IACAC, supra note 8, arts. XVIII, XIII.
94. Id. art. XIV.
95. Id. art. XV.
96. Id. art. XV ("The States Parties shall provide each other the broadest possible
measure of assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of
property or proceeds obtained, derived from or used in the commission of offenses
established in accordance with this Convention.").
97. Moyer, supra note 80, at 176-77.
98. IACAC, supra note 8, art. XVI; see also Carrefio, supra note 84, at 17.
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requested information shall be provided in accordance with
domestic laws and procedures and cannot be used for any purpose
other than those for which the information was sought.99
These provisions create a horizontal network of prosecutors,
investigators, and police agencies that can facilitate the gathering
of evidence for investigations and prosecution of corruption-
related offenses. The provisions also create the legal framework of
an anti-corruption network that can serve to deter corrupt prac-
tices by the effective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.
However, as stated in the recommendations section of this article
infra, national enforcement institutions must be strengthened and
fully equipped to take advantage of the opportunity provided by
these articles to fully achieve the purpose of the IACAC.
Aspiration provisions of the IACAC include Articles III, VIII,
IX, and XI. Article III establishes in detail a number of preventive
measures to be created, maintained, or strengthened. 10 State
Parties are only required to "consider the applicability" of preven-
tive measures in their own institutions, making their implementa-
tion discretionary.'' Although the language of Article III is
arguably weak, ' °2 it is nevertheless essential to deter corrupt prac-
tices and ensure good governance. Consequently, countries that
adopt measures referred in this article will demonstrate a high
level of commitment to fight corruption.'03
Article VIII requires prohibition and punishment of transna-
tional bribery. Transnational bribery occurs when a public official
from one country bribes a public official of another in relation to
an economic transaction.' Article VIII focuses solely on active
bribery, allowing prosecution of the offense by exercising extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction based on the nationality principle. State Party
courts can prosecute a bribe giver for an act that occurs outside
99. Maynard, supra note 78, at 631.
100. IACAC, supra note 8, art. III.
101. Carrefio, supra note 84, at 11.
102. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 1674.
103. The IACAC's preventive measures are stated in Article III, which include:
having standard of conduct for the public sector, as well as training and enforcement
mechanisms of those standards; declaration of assets; standards for systems of hiring
and procurement; government revenue collection and control systems deterring
corruption; denial of tax deductibility of corruption-related expenditures; protection
systems to public servants and private citizens who report acts of corruption;
oversight bodies; requiring companies to keep books, records, and internal accounting
control; and mechanisms to encourage participation of civil society. IACAC, supra
note 8, art. III.
104. Id. art. VIII.
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their territory."' 5 Similarly, a bribed official would face prosecu-
tion by courts where the offense took place, based on the territori-
ality principle." 6  However, the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is not mandatory as it is only applicable to transna-
tional bribery, which is a hortatory provision of the IACAC.
Article IX focuses on illicit enrichment of public officials.0 7
Illicit enrichment is defined as "a significant increase in the assets
of a government official that he cannot reasonably explain in rela-
tion to his lawful earnings during the performance of his func-
tions."08 Articles VIII and IX are not obligatory because they only
request State Parties to "consider" transnational bribery and
illicit enrichment as "acts of corruption" within their legal sys-
tems. ' 9 However, the offense of illicit enrichment assumes the
burden of proof relies in the public official to provide justifications
for an increase in assets."0 Thus, the provisions of Article XI
could be difficult to criminalize in the Caribbean states because
the provisions could contradict the principle of presumption of
innocence. 11' Nonetheless, State Parties of the IACAC must pro-
vide cooperation and assistance insofar as their internal laws
allow it.
Article XI is aspirational. Its heading, Progressive Develop-
ment, means that State Parties are to consider various behaviors
as corrupt offenses to foster the development and harmonization
of national legislation."2 Additional acts of corruption mentioned
in Article XI include the improper use of information or property
by a government official, "any act or omission by any person" to
obtain illicit benefits for himself or any other person, and the
diversion of property for personal benefit."'
B. The Follow-Up Mechanism
In 2001, the OAS General Assembly adopted the "Report of
Buenos Aires on the Mechanism for Follow-up on Implementation
of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,""' which
105. Id.
106. Nichols, supra note 18, at 259.
107. IACAC, supra note 8, art. IX.
108. Id.
109. Id. arts. VIII, IX.
110. Carrefto, supra note 84, at 14.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. TACAC, supra note 8, art. XI.
114. OAS, Report of Buenos Aires: Mechanism for Follow-up of Implementation of
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defines the structure and elements of the Follow-up Mechanism
on Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Cor-
ruption.115 The Report of Buenos Aires states the purpose, charac-
teristics, and procedures of the Follow-up Mechanism, with the
objective of promoting the implementation of the IACAC and facil-
itating harmonization of national anti-corruption legislation
throughout the hemisphere." 6
The Follow-up Mechanism operates under a voluntary peer
review system where each country will provide a self-assessment
of improvement through a questionnaire, which is then analyzed
by other State Parties.1 7 Three main documents define the scope
of this procedure: The Report of Buenos Aires, the Rules of Proce-
dure and Other Provisions,' and a round-specific Methodology. 19
The Mechanism is principally an inter-governmental device, com-
posed of two bodies: the Conference of the States Parties to the
IACAC and the Committee of Experts. 2 ° The Conference of the
States Parties represents the political body whose responsibility is
to review the performance of the Committee of Experts and assure
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, AG/RES. 1784 (XXXI-O/01) (May
2-4, 2001), available at http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.ar/acta%20de%20buenos%20
aires%20ingles.pdf [hereinafter Report of Buenos Aires].
115. OAS Follow-up Mechanism, supra note 10. On June 5, 2000, the OAS General
Assembly requested that the OAS Permanent Council study the existing mechanisms
and recommend an appropriate model to monitor the IACAC's implementation. See
OAS, Enhancement of Probity in the Hemisphere and Follow-up on the Inter-American
Program for Cooperation in the Fight Against Corruption, AG/RES. 1723 (XXX-O/00)
(June 5, 2000), available at http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/english/agres-1723-
00.htm.
116. Report of Buenos Aires, supra note 114 (stating that the purposes of the OAS
Follow-up Mechanism is to: "promote the implementation of the IACAC ... [;] [t]o
follow up on the commitments made by the States Parties ... [; and to] facilitate...
the harmonization of the legislation of the States Parties.").
117. Roberto De Michele, The Follow-Up Mechanism of the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, A Preliminary Assessment: Is the Glass Half Empty?,
10 Sw. J.L. & TRADE Am. 295, 304 (2004).
118. OAS, Rules of Procedure and Other Provisions of the Committee of Experts of
the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, SG/MESICIC/doc.9/04 rev.3 (Dec. 15, 2006), available
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicicrules.pdf [hereinafter Rules of
Procedure].
119. OAS, Methodology for the Review of the Implementation of the Provisions of the
Inter-American Convention against Corruption selected within the Framework of the
First Round (May 24, 2002), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ followup
_method.htm [hereinafter Methodology].
120. The composition of the Committee of Experts of the OAS Follow-up
Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption [hereinafter Committee of Experts] can be found at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/spanishmec comexp.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
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its funding.121
The Follow-up Mechanism was adopted in 2001, and the Com-
mittee of Experts began functioning in June 2002.122 The Rules of
Procedure prescribe the structure and operation of the Commit-
tee, which consists of representatives appointed by each State
Party, who are to be impartial and objective in their assess-
ments. 123 The Committee of Experts is responsible for the techni-
cal analysis of implementation of the IACAC. However, each
State Party can appoint and change as many experts as it deems
fit. 124
The Committee of Experts reviews the State Party's measures
in a series of "rounds."25 At the beginning of each round, the Com-
mittee must choose what provision is to be analyzed, adopt a ques-
tionnaire to be answered by the State Party members and the civil
society, and adopt a methodology that will serve as a guide to
review the selected provisions for that round.126 The Rules of Pro-
cedure regulate the role of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in the review process. NGOs are important elements of
the process because they are able to provide independent assess-
ment about implementing measures by responding and critiquing
a country's reply to the questionnaire. Moreover, NGOs can par-
ticipate and make presentations in formal and informal meetings
of the Committee. 1
27
After analyzing the responses to the questionnaire by the
121. OAS, Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the States Parties to the
Mechanism for Follow-Up on Implementation of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, SG/MESICIC/doc.58/04 rev.7 (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://
www.oas.org/juridico/englishfollowup-confrules.pdf [hereinafter Conference of State
Parties' Rules of Procedure].
122. De Michele, supra note 117, at 313.
123. Report of Buenos Aires, supra note 114, pt. 3 ("[The OAS Follow-up
Mechanism] shall be impartial and objective in its operations and in the conclusions it
reaches.").
124. Rules of Procedure, supra note 118, art. 2, at 3 ("[A] State Party shall notify
the Secretariat when there is a change in its representation to the Committee.").
125. Nagle, supra note 20, at 1675.
126. Id.
127. The Committee in its Fifth Meeting (Feb. 2-6, 2004) amended Article 35 of the
Rules of Procedure to include a second paragraph, providing the civil society with
more active participation. The amendment reads: "The Committee will invite civil
society organizations to give verbal presentations, in formal meetings, of the
documents they presented in accordance with the provisions in Article 33 (a) and (b)
of these Rules." See OAS, Report on Activities to Date by the Committee of Experts of
the Follow-up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, SG/MESICIC/doc.95/04 rev.3 (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http://
www.oas.org/juridico/englishlmec-activity.pdf.
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State Parties and NGOs, the Committee issues a country report
that contains observations and recommendations regarding the
degree of compliance with the IACAC. The country reports can be
made public though the Internet before the round finishes at the
request of the reviewed country. 128 If a reviewed country does not
authorize its publication, however, the country report can only be
made public after the entire round finishes; that is, after all the
State Parties have been reviewed.'29 Reports presented by State
Parties that reflect progress in implementing the IACAC are pub-
lic via the Internet.3 ' Moreover, responses to the questionnaire by
State Parties and the civil society are also public through the
Internet."'
In April 2004, the Conference of State Parties adopted
"Schedule for Accelerating the Process of Analysis within the
Framework of the First Round."132 This Committee is involved in
analyzing the provisions on preventive measures,33 assistance
and cooperation, and central authority designation.' As of 2007,
it has met on ten occasions and has reviewed implementing mea-
sures by Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Costa Rica, Venezuela,
Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, Honduras, El Salvador, Dominican
Republic, and the Bahamas. 3 ' At its seventh meeting, held on
March 2005, the Committee adopted six country reports including
128. Rules of Procedure, supra note 118, art. 25(g).
129. Methodology, supra note 119, § VIII.
130. Rules of Procedure, supra note 118, art. 30 (explaining that at the beginning of
each committee meeting, State Parties can present national progress reports about
their progress in implementing the IACAC). The Committee of Experts decided to
make public the national progress reports during its fourth meeting, which are
available at http://www.oas.orgjuridico/english/mec-rep-progress.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2007).
131. OAS, Questionnaire on Provisions selected by the Committee of Experts for
Analysis within the Framework of the First Round (May 24, 2002), available at http:ll
www.oas.org/juridico/englishlquestionnaire.doc.
132. OAS, Schedule for Accelerating the Process of Analysis Within the Framework
of the First Round, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishmec_sched.htm
(last visited Apr. 03, 2007).
133. IACAC, supra note 8, art. III (analyzing paragraph 1 on conduct standards,
paragraph 2 on enforcement mechanisms for the conduct standards, paragraph 4 on
assets disclosure, paragraph 9 on anti-corruption oversight bodies, and paragraph 11
on civil society participation).
134. OAS, Report on Activities to Date by the Committee of Experts of the Follow-up
Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (Feb. 17, 2004), at 4, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mec_
activity.pdf.
135. OAS Follow-up Mechanism, supra note 10, http://www.oas.org/juridico/
englishlmecjrep-progress.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
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those from Honduras and Trinidad & Tobago. Most recently in the
tenth meeting, which took place in December 2006, the Committee
considered the preliminary draft reports from the Second Round
of Review for Argentina, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Ecuador,
and Honduras. Among other items on the agenda and calendar,
the Committee reviewed the results from the Second Meeting of
the Conference of States Parties to the MESICIC."'36
IV. EFFECTIVENESS VIA IMPLEMENTATION
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the impact of the
IACAC in corruption perception and corruption risk levels. To
reach that objective, the following analysis will shed light on
implementing measures adopted by the chosen countries. There-
fore, to understand the relationship between compliance, imple-
menting national legislation, and effectiveness of the IACAC, it is
necessary to comprehend the difference between these three
concepts.
Compliance is defined as "an actor's behavior that conforms to
a treaty's explicit rules." 37 Compliance determines if a State
Party's behavior to an agreement conforms to the letter of that
treaty.138 Thus, compliance depends on both behavior and "the
stringency and scope of the legal standard."1 39 Experts argue that
with respect to most international treaties, governments negotiate
and adopt the agreements to which they know in advance they can
comply.14 ° In this respect, a simple compliance with the letter of
the international treaty does not reflect its utility or impact, as
compliance can occur without any implementing efforts by the
parties."'
A situation of high compliance that lacks implementing
efforts occurs when the IACAC merely codifies the current behav-
ior of a State Party.' In such a case, compliance can be auto-
matic. Article VI of the IACAC reflects a case of automatic
136. See Office of Legal Coop., OAS Dept. of Int'l Legal Affairs, 10th Plenary
Meeting of the Committee of Experts of the MESICIC, ANTI-CORRUPTION NEWSLETTER,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/newsletter/nl-en_2.htm.
137. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 391 (2000) (citing RONALD B. MITCHELL,
INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY
COMPLIANCE 30 (1994)).
138. VICTOR, supra note 17, at 7.
139. Id. at 661.
140. Id. at 662.
141. Raustiala, supra note 137, at 392.
142. Id.
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compliance with respect to the examined Central American coun-
try and Trinidad & Tobago. This provision requires State Parties
to criminalize certain acts of corruption, including passive and
active corruption."' As demonstrated infra in Part V, at the time
of ratification of the IACAC, these examined countries already
considered as offenses the acts of corruption enumerated in Article
VI.'" Guatemala and Honduras had already criminalized passive
and active bribery in their respective Criminal Codes. 45 The same
is true for Trinidad & Tobago, which had the Prevention of Cor-
ruption Act in place since 1987.146 Thus, these three countries
reflect a case of automatic compliance regarding Article VI of the
IACAC.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
Because simple compliance does not reflect the impact of the
IACAC, it is important to explore the concepts of implementation
and effectiveness. 7 Implementation is the process of "putting
international commitments into practice,"4 s including the promul-
gation of new regulations and legislation by the national govern-
ments.1 49 It is one of the most important factors that affect the
degree of effectiveness of an international treaty. 50 On the other
hand, effectiveness is a different concept that entails a favorable
change in behavior in a State Party.' The effectiveness of the
IACAC is measured by the extent it leads "to change in behavior"
that furthers its goal. 2 Effectiveness is not the ability of the
IACAC to solve the problem of corruption. 53 Thus, the IACAC will
143. See discussion supra at Part III.A; see also IACAC, supra note 8, art. VI.
144. See Carrefio, supra note 84, at 13 ("The overriding criterion throughout the
negotiations [of Article VI] was to include [] only those crimes already defined as
offenses in the respective national criminal legislation."); see also discussion infra at
part V.
145. See discussion infra at Parts V.A & V.B (Guatemala & Honduras).
146. See discussion infra at Part V.C (Trinidad & Tobago).
147. Raustiala, supra note 137, at 395 ("The existence of noncompliance with a
legal rule on its own does not indicate much about the effectiveness of that rule.").
148. Id. at 392.
149. VICTOR, supra note 17, at 4-6.
150. Id. at 4 (stating that there are a "range of factors, beyond implementation,
that affect behavior and determine the effectiveness of international accords").
151. Raustiala, supra note 137, at 394.
152. Id.
153. VICTOR, supra note 17, at 6; see also Raustiala, supra note 137, at 394; ORAN R.
YOUNG, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL
CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 3-5 (1999).
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be effective even if it does not eliminate actual corruption, but
causes desired behavioral change.'
Because implementation is an important factor that leads to
behavioral changes to further the goal of the IACAC, this section
will review the most important anti-corruption implementing leg-
islation adopted by each examined country (Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago). The first two countries
share similar characteristics including geographic location, area,
population, and legal system, and are both portrayed with the
highest levels of corruption perception among all Central America
countries. 5 ' The last two countries share similarities in territory,
population, geographic location, and legal systems. Guatemala
and Honduras' legal systems are based on Roman civil law,
whereas the Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago's legal systems are
based on English common law.
Another important consideration in choosing these specific
countries was the difference in ratification date. Honduras and
Trinidad & Tobago ratified the IACAC in 1998,156 whereas Guate-
mala and Jamaica ratified the IACAC in 2001."'1 It is important
to note the three-year difference between the ratification dates of
the groups of countries. Thus, ratification date is used as an
explanatory variable to determine improvement in corruption per-
ception and risk levels (dependent variable).
This difference creates a positive expectation for the first-to-
ratify countries. An improvement in the dependent variable is
anticipated earlier in the countries that ratified the IACAC in
1998. This intuition is based on the presumption that early ratifi-
cation translates into more time to adopt implementing legisla-
tion. New legislation influences desired behavior change,'
including the reduction of corrupt practices, which is reflected in
an improvement of corruption perception and risk levels.'59 The
154. Raustiala, supra note 137, at 394; see also VICTOR, supra note 17, at 6-8.
155. TI Corruption Index, http://www.transparency.org/layout/set/print/policy-
research/surveys-indices/cpi (last visited Apr. 03, 2007).
156. For IACAC ratification dates, see http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-
58.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter IACA Ratification Dates].
157. Id.
158. VICTOR, supra note 17, at 1-2.
159. See discussion infra at Part VI. As demonstrated infra, neither the ratification
date nor implementing legislation seems to be affecting change in corruption
perception for any of the examined countries. Moreover, only Honduras shows
improvement in corruption risk levels for one time period. The other three countries
do not reflect any positive change in corruption risk levels influenced by
implementing legislation nor ratification date.
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IACAC does not require State Parties to adopt a specific legisla-
tive model. Each State Party has the discretion to implement
laws, policies, and institutions to fulfill their obligations according
to their national legal system. Thus, each country has adopted
new anti-corruption legislation since ratification.
Honduras has made the most extensive institutional and
legal changes, including the adoption of constitutional amend-
ments to prosecute high-ranking government officials and the con-
version to an adversarial criminal system.16 ° Trinidad & Tobago
has enacted two important anticorruption legislations: Integrity
in Public Life Act 6' and Freedom of Information Act.162 Moreover,
Trinidad & Tobago created an institution to ensure transparency
and accountability in the government (Freedom for Information
Unit).63 Guatemala created an Anticorruption Commission6 . and
passed a Law on Probity6 ' to assure transparency in the perform-
ance of public officials.'66 Finally, Jamaica adopted the Corruption
Prevention Act'67 to implement the terms of the IACAC. Further-
more, Jamaica took the approach of Trinidad & Tobago by promul-
gating freedom of information legislation, the Access to
Information Act,'68 and creating an institution to assure its com-
pliance, the Access to Information Unit.'69
The following subparts will explain the legislation adopted by
each country. To illustrate the degree of implementation, the sub-
parts will describe the anti-corruption legislation in place at the
160. See discussion infra at Part V.B.
161. See Integrity in Public Life Act (2000) (Trin. & Tobago), available at http:l!
www.ttparliament.org/bills/acts/2000/a2000-83.pdf [hereinafter Trin. & Tobago
Integrity Act].
162. See The Freedom of Information Act (1999) (Trin. & Tobago), available at
http://www.ttparliament.org/bills/acts/1999/a1999-26.pdf [hereinafter Trin. & Tobago
FOI].
163. See discussion infra at Part V.D.
164. See Guatemala, Comisi6n para la Transparencia y Anticorrupci6n
[Tranparency and Corruption Commission], available at http://www.
guatemala.gob.gtentidades.php?tipo=3&codigo=33 (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
165. See Decreto No. 89-2002, Ley de Probidad y Responsabilidades de
Funcionarios y Empleados Pdblicos [Decree No. 89-2002 Law on Probity and
Responsibility Public Officers and Employees], 71 D.C. AM. 12, 24 de Diciembre de
2002 (Guat.), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2002/gtdcx89-
2002.pdf [hereinafter Guatemalan Law on Probity].
166. See id. at 2; see also discussion infra at Part V.A.
167. See Corruption Prevention Act (2001) (Jam.), available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/spanish/jam-resl0.pdf [hereinafter Jamaican CPA].
168. See Access to Information Act (2002) (Jam.), available at http:/www.
moj.gov.jmlatiact [hereinafter Jamaican ATI].
169. See discussion infra at Part V.C.
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time of ratification (automatic compliance) and any implementing
legislation promulgated after ratification (implementation). 170
A. Guatemala
Guatemala signed the IACAC on June 4, 1996, and ratified it
on August 3, 2001.111 Before ratification, Guatemala employed a
special prosecution office for corruption within its Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. According to Guatemalan regulation, the corruption
prosecutor investigated and prosecuted public officers and individ-
uals that committed criminal acts.172 Crimes prosecuted included
those relating to the "public administration and crimes against
the economy of the country, the tributary regime and the custom
regime.""'17 Cases were assigned by the Attorney General's
Office. 74 Guatemalan regulations do not specifically state the acts
of corruption listed in the IACAC, but its terms are broad enough
to cover them. This qualifies as automatic compliance with Article
VI of the IACAC.'75 Nonetheless, these regulations have a major
flaw in that they grant high-ranking public officials broad discre-
tionary power to decide which corruption cases should be investi-
gated and prosecuted.
7 6
In October 2002, the Guatemalan Government created an
Anti-Corruption Commission17 ' to comply with Article III (11) of
the IACAC."'7 This commission brought public offices and the civil
society together to combat corruption. It also created a network
composed of the Attorney General's Office, the Public Prosecution
170. See discussion supra at Part IV.
171. See IACA Ratification Dates, supra note 156.
172. See Accord No. 01-2000, Reglamento de Organizaci6n y Funciones de la
Fiscalia de Secci6n Contra la Corrupci6n [Organization and Function Regulation for
the Corruption Prosecution Section] (Guat.), available at www.oas.org/juridico/
spanish/gtm-res22.doc (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
173. Id. art. 1.
174. Id. art. 2.
175. See discussion supra at Part IV.
176. It is important to note that illicit enrichment is not a crime in the Guatemalan
Criminal Code.
177. See Guatemala, Respuesta al Cuestionario del Comitg de Expertos del
Mecanismo de Seguimiento de la Implementaci6n de la Convenci6n Interamericana
contra la Corrupci6n en relaci6n a las Disposiciones Relacionadas en el Marco de la
Primera Ronda [Guatemala's Response to the Committee of Experts' Questionnaire
Regarding Articles Analyzed in the First Round] 17 (Guat.), available at http://www.
oas.orgjuridico/spanish/gtm-res2.pdf [hereinafter Guatemala's Response].
178. See IACAC, supra note 8, art. III; see also Carrefio, supra note 84, at 11.
Article III of the IACAC is considered as an aspirational provision because it only
requires State Parties "to consider" the creation, strengthening and maintenance of
mechanisms for civil society participation. See IACAC, supra note 8, art. III.
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Office, the Institute of Public Criminal Defense, the Ministry of
Governance, the Judicial Branch, and the Association of Journal-
ists to facilitate investigation and proceedings regarding corrup-
tion within the judicial system. 179 However, by late 2003 the
Guatemalan commission was facing allegations of non-
transparency.
1 80
In December 2002, the Guatemalan Legislature adopted an
important piece of anti-corruption legislation through Decree No.
89-2002, "Law on Probity and Responsibility of Officers and Public
Employees," which became effective in February 2003.181 The
decree's objective was to create norms and procedures to assure
transparency in public officials' performance.1 2 This legislation




Decree No. 89-2002 established a mechanism that requires public
officials to declare assets and liabilities while in office, and to pre-
vent illicit enrichment or misuse of Guatemalan property.i'4 None-
theless, the decree has a confidentiality obligation, Article XXI,
which prohibits disclosing information about such declarations
unless required under a criminal proceeding."5 More importantly,
the decree's objective is to prevent illicit enrichment in an attempt
to comply with Article IX (aspirational) of the IACAC. However,
under the Guatemalan Criminal Code, concealment of property is
considered as a criminal offense," 6 not illicit enrichment.
7
At the time of IACAC's ratification, Guatemala already had
179. See Guatemala's Response, supra note 177, at 15.
180. TI, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004: Political Corruption 197 (2004),
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download-gcr/download-
gcr 2004.
181. See Guatemalan Law on Probity, supra note 165.
182. Id.
183. See IACAC, supra note 8, arts. III (4), XI (a), (b) & (d).
184. Public officials must present declarations of assets and liabilities at the
beginning and end of their terms of office and on an annual basis according to specific
criteria set out in the Law on Probity. See Guatemalan Law on Probity, supra note
165, art. 21.
185. See discussion infra at Part V.A (Honduras). According to the Organic Law of
the Superior Court of Accounts, an element of confidentiality is not required in the
Honduran legislation.
186. See Decreto No. 17-73, Codigo Penal [Criminal Code], art. 447 (Guat.),
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/gtm/sp--gtm-int-text-cp.pdf [herein-
after Guatemalan Criminal Code].
187. INFORME INDEPENDIENTE DE SEGUIMIENTO A LA IMPLEMENTACI6N DE LA
CONVENCION INTERAMERICANA CONTRA LA CORRUPCI6N EN GUATEMALA [Independent
Follow-up Report about the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption in Guatemala] 5 (Guat.) available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
spanish/gtm-res3.pdf [hereinafter GUATEMALAN CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT].
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several civil service laws to regulate and prescribe the rights and
responsibilities of public officials.88 Equally, the Executive
Branch is governed by the "Executive Branch Law," which con-
tains general norms to assure ethics and transparency.189 In this
respect, Guatemala chose to implement the IACAC; not by adopt-
ing new legislation, but instead by issuing specific norms of ethics
as Accords (or Acuerdos). The Accords are legally binding govern-
mental agreements, 190 which are the means to fulfill Article III (1)
of the IACAC. 191 For example, in 2001, the "Ethical Standards of
the Judicial Branch" was adopted to govern the ethics and morals
in the judicial system.92 Equally, in 2004, the Executive Branch
issued Governmental Accord No. 197-2004, which regulates the
Executive Branch's personnel including public officers, employees,
and advisors. 93
In 2004, the Executive Branch created the Transparency and
Anticorruption Commission.1 94 The Commissioner is an executive
appointee that serves a term of one year, which can be extended
by Presidential authorization.19 The Commissioner is responsible
for identifying adequate anticorruption measures to promote
transparency within the government.'96 For the purposes of
IACAC Article XVIII, the Commissioner represents the Central
Authority.
At the time of the Guatemala's IACAC ratification, its crimi-
nal laws already considered active and passive bribery criminal
188. See Decreto No. 1748, Ley de Servicio Civil [Civil Service Law] (Guat.),
available at http://www.mspas.gob.gt/dgrvcs/DRACES/REGULACIONES/Dt1748.pdff
Decreto No. 48-99, Ley de Servicio Civil del Organismo Judicial [Judicial Branch Civil
Service Law] (Guat.), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/1999/
gtdcx48-1999.pdf; Decreto No. 44-86, Ley de Servicio Civil del Organismo Legislativo
[Legislative Branch Civil Service Law] (Guat.), available at http://www.
congreso.gob.gtlDocs/serviciocivil/titl.htm.
189. See Decreto No. 114-97, Ley del Organismo Ejecutivo [Executive Branch Law]
(Guat.), available at http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/docs/LeydelOrganismoEjecutivo.
pdf.
190. The main distinction between decrees and agreements is the governmental
branch that issues them: In Guatemala, Congress issues decrees, whereas the
Executive and Judicial branches commonly issue Accords.
191. See Guatemala's Response, supra note 177, at 3-4.
192. Id. at 3.
193. See NORMAS DE ETICA DEL ORGANISMo EJECUTIVO [ExEcUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS
NORMS] (Guat.), available at http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/docs/NormasEticasdel
organismoejecutivo.pdf.
194. Acuerdo Gubernativo Ndimero 99-2004 [Governmental Accords No. 99-2004]
(Guat.), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gtarchivos/acuerdos/2004/gtagx099




2007] CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
offenses, showing a case of automatic compliance. 9 7 Active brib-
ery is directed at those who give or offer bribes to a public officer
(supply side of corruption). 198 Passive bribery is an offense for
which a public officer that requests or accepts a bribe can be pun-
ished (demand side of corruption).99 Both active and passive brib-
ery are punishable by two to eight years in prison.200 Criminal
jurisdiction extends to acts committed within Guatemala and by
Guatemalan nationals. 20 ' Furthermore, bank secrecy is protected
under Guatemalan law unless law enforcement agencies request
the information in a narcotic investigation proceeding.2 2 This
"drug-investigation" exception was created under Article 58 of
Guatemala's Criminal Code, which regulates drug trafficking.2 3
Guatemala is part of several bilateral Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Agreements. Bilateral agreements currently in force
include those with Argentina, Belgium, Great Britain, Ecuador,
Spain, United States, and Mexico. 204 Thus, Guatemala has inter-
national assistance treaties in places that can facilitate the inves-
tigation of corrupt practices though gathering evidence and
cooperating in other legal proceedings. Additionally, certain Gua-
temalan anti-corruption law initiatives are pending approval.
These initiatives seek to fill the gaps in the anti-corruption legis-
lation in existence. 20 The most important initiative includes the
"Framework Law on the Protection of Persons that Denounce Acts
of Corruption," which protects "whistleblowers"20 6 and fulfills a
requirement of Article III (8) of the IACAC.
The "Anti-Corruption Law" initiative creates a strict scrutiny
mechanism for assets belonging to public officials with the objec-
tive of preventing illicit enrichment. 20 7 Additionally, the initiative
197. See Guatemalan Criminal Code, supra note 186, tit. XIII, ch. III.
198. Id. art. 442.
199. See id. art. 439.
200. Id. arts. 439, 442, 443.
201. Id. art. 5; see also Guatemala Code of Criminal Prosecution, art. 38, available
at http://www.congreso.gob.gt.
202. Ley de Bancos y Grupos Financieros [Law on Banks and Financial Groups],
art. 63 (Guat.), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/ 2004/leyes.asp.
203. Id. art. 58.
204. Guatemala's Response, supra note 177, at 25-27.
205. Id. at 9, 17.
206. Iniciativa No. 2632, Ley Modelo sobre Protecci6n de Personas que Denuncian
Actos de Corrupci6n [Framework Law about Protection of Persons that Denounce
Acts of Corruption] (Guat.), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/gt/veriniciativa.
asp?id=350.
207. Iniciativa No. 3197, Ley Anticorrupci6n [Anti-Corruption Law] (Guat.),
available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/iniciativas/registro3l97.pdf.
515
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to enact the "Law on Mechanisms for the Participation of Civil
Society in the Prevention of Corruption" assures active civil soci-
ety participation in corruption prevention.2"' Finally, initiatives
Nos. 3195 and 3210, presented on February 2005 and March 2005
respectively, typify illicit enrichment as a crime (thus complying
with Article IX),20 9 and strengthen criminal penalties for other cor-
rupt practices, including embezzlement and misappropriation.210
B. Honduras
Honduras signed the IACAC in March 1996 and ratified it in
May 1998.211 According to Article 18 of the Honduran Constitu-
tion, international treaties are non-self-executing, but will prevail
over national legislation if they do not contradict the Honduras
Constitution.2 2 The IACAC determines which acts of corruption
are punishable at every level of hierarchy.1 3 Therefore, in 2003,
the Honduran Congress repealed Articles 200 and 205(15) and
amended Article 313(2) of its Constitution to allow impeachment
and prosecution of congressmen and of the "highest officers" of the
country.214 This new constitutional right provides a judicial tool
for all individuals to access information about themselves con-
tained in public or private databases, and to modify, remove, or
208. Iniciativa No. 2617, Ley de Mecanismos de Participaci6n de la Sociedad Civil
en la Prevenci6n de la Corrupci6n [Law on Mechanisms for Participation of Civil
Society in the Prevention of Corruption] (Guat.), available at http://www.
congreso.gob.gt/ archivos/iniciativas/registro2617.pdf.
209. Iniciativa No. 3195, Reformas al C6digo Penal, art. 11 [Reforms to the
Criminal Code] (Guat.), available at http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/iniciativas/
registro3195.pdf.
210. Iniciativa No. 3209, Aprobar las Reformas al C6digo Penal, arts. 12-18
[Initiative to Approve Criminal Code Reforms] (Guat.), available at http://www.
congreso.gob.gt/archivos/iniciativas/registro3209.pdf.
211. IACAC, supra note 8.
212. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS] art. 18 (1982), available at http://www.honduras.netl
hondurasconstitution.html.
213. IACAC, supra note 8, art. I.
214. See Honduras, Cuestionario en Relaci6n con las Disposiciones Seleccionadas
por el Comitg de Expertos para ser Analizadas en el Marco de la Primera Ronda
[Questionnaire Regarding the Articles Selected by the Committee of Experts to be
Analyzed in the First Round], available at www.oas.orgjuridico/spanish/hnd-res2.pdf
[hereinafter Honduras' Response]; see also Honduras National Progress Report,
Seventh Meeting of the Committee of Experts, http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanishmec
_avancehndVII.pdf (stating that Decree No. 175-2003 repeals Articles 200 and 205
(15) of the Honduran Constitution and amends Article 313(2) by granting powers to
the Honduran Supreme Court of Justice to prosecute at the highest level of
hierarchy).
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correct that information when necessary.215 The Honduran Con-
gress also introduced a second amendment to Article 182 of the
Constitution in March 2005, establishing the figure of Habeas
Data.216 This second constitutional amendment is a legal instru-
ment to promote "transparency in government, protect personal
privacy against the arbitrary or illegitimate use of personal data,
and ensure accountability to and participation by society."
217
Furthermore, since ratification, Honduras has undergone
multiple reforms of its criminal justice system and of key anti-cor-
ruption institutions. 218 For instance, in 2002, a new Code of Crim-
inal Procedure replaced the written, inquisitive criminal system
with an adversarial system modeled on the Anglo-American jus-
tice system.2"9 Afterwards, the Honduras Supreme Court of Jus-
tice created the Inter-Institutional Commission of Criminal
Justice, comprised of the Supreme Court, the Office of the Public
Prosecutor, the Attorney General's Office, the Supreme Court of
Accounts, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Interior, and
the National Congress, to coordinate the implementation of the
new criminal system.22 °
Also, in 2002, the Honduran Congress issued the Organic Law
of the Superior Court of Accounts,221 which created the Superior
Court of Accounts (SCA) by merging the Administrative Director-
215. INTER-AM. COMM. HUMAN RTS. [IACHR], ANNUAL REPORT 2001: REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ch. 1 (General Reports) (2001),
available at http://www.cidh.org/Relatoria/showarticle.asp?artID=404&lID=l.
216. Honduras' Response, supra note 214, at 8-9; see also Red Probidad, Congreso
Ratifica la Figura del Hdbeas Data [Congress Ratifies Habeas Data], PROBIDAD, Mar.
18, 2005, http://probidad.org/index.php?seccion= comunicados/2005/032.html.
217. Probidad, supra note 216, at 113.
218. See discussion infra at Part VI.A.3 (showing that the 2002 and 2003 in-depth
legal and institutional changes, influences a decrease of corruption risk levels in
Honduras). The ICRG data specially shows that Honduras improves the risk points
in 2002 and 2003. See id.
219. REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE IACAC SELECTED FOR REVIEW
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIRST ROUND 3, SG/MESICIC/doc.141/04 rev.4 (Mar.
12, 2005), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mec-rephnd.pdf
[hereinafter HONDURAS FINAL COUNTRY REPORT].
220. Republic of Honduras, Honduras National Progress Report, Fourth Meeting of
the Committee of Experts (July 14, 2003), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
spanishmec avancehon.pdf.
221. Decreto No. 10-2002-E, Ley Orgdnica del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas
[Organic Law of the Superior Court of Accounts], art. 115 (Hond.), available at http:/!
www.tsc.gob.hn/normativa2.htm [hereinafter SCA Organic Law] (establishing that
Article 115 of the SCA Organic Law derogates the Comptroller General Organic Law
(Decree No. 224-93) and the Law Against Unlawful Enrichment of Civil Servants
(Decree No. 301 of 1975)).
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ate and the Office of the Comptroller General.222 The SCA is an
independent governmental institution that has been working
since January 2003.223 The SCA is responsible for implementing
the IACAC and for assuring the proper administration of national
resources. 24 It is also the Central Authority of Honduras for pur-
poses of the IACAC, with an objective of strengthening mecha-
nisms to prevent, detect, and punish "acts of corruption in any
form. "225 The SCA is specifically responsible for implementing
non-mandatory provisions of the IACAC, such as Article III on
preventive measures. 6 To fulfill the requirement of Article III
(11) of the IACAC, the Organic Law established the National Anti-
Corruption Council, which is responsible for coordinating the par-
ticipation of civil society in anti-corruption initiatives.227
Furthermore, the SCA is responsible for establishing a mech-
anism that assures transparency of public functions.22' The SCA
Organic Law created a Division of Ethics and Probity responsible
for managing a new system for registering declarations of assets
and income of public officials, which must be presented on an
annual basis.229 Noncompliance of disclosure is considered an
offense according to Article 350 of the Honduras Criminal Code.23°
The SCA is also responsible for creating and strengthening the
222. Id.
223. Id. art. 6.
224. Id. art. 68; see also Honduras' Response, supra note 214, at 11, 23-24;
HONDURAS FINAL COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 219, at 4, 6, 10.
225. SCA Organic Law, supra note 221, art. 37; see also Honduras' Response, supra
note 214, at 55; HONDURAS FINAL COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 219, at 35.
226. SCA Organic Law, supra note 221, arts. 68-70. Article 69 creates a "Social
Comptrollership," which is a process whereby citizens help the SCA fulfill its duties.
Id. art. 69. Article 70 establishes the scope of the Social Controllership, stating that
the Court is responsible for "fostering transparent public administration and
establishing processes and mechanisms to allow citizens to participate" to encourage
transparent management of civil servants and to assure the investigation of
complaints. Id. art. 70.
227. Id. art. 71; see also HONDURAS FINAL COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 219, at 21
(stating that Executive Decree No. 015-2000 created the National Anti-Corruption
Council, which was strengthened by including representatives of civil society though
Decision No. 064-2002.).
228. SCA Organic Law, supra note 221, art. 3.
229. Id. The SCA Organic Law derogated the Law Against Unlawful Enrichment of
Civil Servants. See id. Therefore, for interpreting purposes when the derogated law
is mentioned in other legislation, such as the Criminal Code, it is replaced by the SCA
Organic Law.
230. Decreto No. 144-83, C6digo Penal [Criminal Code] (Hond.), art. 350, available
at http://www.congreso.gob.hn/constitucionesy codigos/codigos/codigopenal.pdf
[hereinafter Honduras Criminal Code]. The Honduras Criminal Code has been
reformed by Decrees No. 120-94 & No. 127-99 and Norms 63-44, 177-99, 120-94, 59-
97, 34-82, & 459-77. Id.
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mechanism that prevents, investigates and punishes acts of cor-
ruption."' It has a duty to investigate, corroborate, and determine
the existence of unlawful enrichment.232 In this respect, it is
important to highlight that the Organic Law dedicates whole sec-
tions to corruption23 3 and illicit enrichment.2 34 More importantly,
in complying with Article XVI of the IACAC, the SCA will have
complete access to financial statements and bank accounts of civil
servants and their relatives during its investigations of illicit
enrichment.23
Furthermore, in 2002, the Honduran Legislature passed the
"Law Against the Crime of Laundering Assets."23 s Under this new
law, the term "assets" is defined to include "any type of tangible or
intangible property, negotiable instruments, securities, docu-
ments, or legal instruments that prove property and other rights
over these assets."237 The 2002 "Law Against the Crime of Laun-
dering Assets" also includes provisions that detail the obligations
of banking institutions regarding information disclosure, registra-
tion, and notification of financial transactions and sanctions
against financial institutions that violate the law.
Even before the IACAC's ratification, Honduras' Criminal
Code criminalized bribery,238  embezzlement,2 9  misappropria-
tion,240 and extortion.241 Moreover, Section V of the Criminal Code
applies to active and passive bribery of public officers and govern-
ment employees.242 In this respect, Honduras reflects an example
of automatic compliance vis-A-vis Article VI of the IACAC.243
Criminal jurisdiction is based on nationality and territoriality;
244
231. SCA Organic Law, supra note 221, art. 54(6).
232. Id. art. 54(3).
233. Id. arts. 68-72.
234. Id. arts. 62-67. Article 62 defines Illicit Enrichment in the terms of Article IX
of the IACAC. Id. art. 62.
235. Id. art. 67(2); see also Honduras' Response, supra note 214, at 16; HONDURAS
FINAL COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 219, at 22.
236. Decreto 45-2002 Ley Contra el Delito de Lavado de Activos [Law Against the
Crime of Asset Laundering], art. 2 (Hond.), available at http://www.unodc.org/enl/
showDocument.do?tab=details&cmd=add&country=HON&node=docs&documentUid
=2242&language=SPA [hereinafter Honduras ATI].
237. Id.; see also Honduras' Response, supra note 214, at 53.
238. Honduras Criminal Code, supra note 230, § V, arts. 361-369.
239. Id. arts. 370-71.
240. Id. art. 372.
241. Id. art. 377.
242. Id. art. 396 (stating that Article396 applies to any member of the judiciary or a
tribunal that accepts bribes (passive bribery)).
243. See discussion supra at Part IV.
244. See Honduras Criminal Code, supra note 230, arts. 3-6; see also Decreto No.
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however, Heads of State, Diplomats, and Governments of foreign
countries enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution.245 The Spe-
cial Anti-Corruption Prosecutor carries out criminal prosecution
of corruption cases in Honduras.246
Honduras is also part of several bilateral and multilateral
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements to receive and provide legal
assistance and mutual cooperation to fight corruption.247 Moreo-
ver, the SCA is the main body receiving requests for assistance
and cooperation for the purposes of the IACAC.24s The SCA
Organic Law states that the IACAC will be the legal basis for pro-
viding assistance for the investigation and prosecution of corrup-
tion acts.249
C. Jamaica
Jamaica signed the IACAC in March 1996 and ratified it in
March 2001.250 The Jamaican Government amended the Parlia-
mentary (Integrity of Members) Act in 2001 to increase penalties
for its breaches by parliamentarians (members of the House of
Representatives and Senate), and to increase the punishment of
asset nondisclosures.2 1 The Parliamentary Act created the Integ-
rity Commission,252 which receives and reviews declarations of
assets from members of the Corruption Commission and parlia-
mentarians,2"3 thereby complying with the aspirational provision
of the IACAC. 24 The Integrity Commission must report any act of
corruption on the part of any parliamentarian to the Director of
Public Prosecution for investigation.255
One year after ratification, Jamaica enacted the Corruption
Prevention Act (CPA)256 to better implement the terms of the
189-84, Codigo de Procedimientos Penales [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 54
(Hond.), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/hnd/sp hnd-int-text-cprp.pdf.
245. Honduras Criminal Code, supra note 230, art. 8.
246. HONDURAS FINAL COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 219, at 19.
247. Id. at 33-34.
248. Honduras' Response, supra note 214, at 55.
249. SCA Organic Law, supra note 221, art. 68.
250. IACAC, supra note 8.
251. Parliament Integrity of Members Act (1973) (Jam.), available at http://www.
oas.org/juridico/spanishlj am-res24.pdf.
252. Id. § 3 (stating that the Integrity Commission consists of the Auditor-General
and four appointees of the Governor-General). The appointed members serve a period
of two to five years and may be reappointed.
253. Id. § 4(1).
254. See IACAC, supra note 8, art. III(1).
255. Id.
256. See Jamaican CPA, supra note 167.
520
2007] CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 521
IACAC.257 The CPA criminalizes passive and active corruption by
public servants, ' active corruption by any person within Jamai-
can territory,29 embezzlement, 260 transnational bribery, 26 1 and
illicit enrichment. 62 Article 14 of the CPA defines "acts of corrup-
tion" in similar terms as the IACAC. Criminal responsibility
extends to Jamaican citizens who commit acts of corruption in a
foreign state263 and to persons who instigate, aid, abet or are acces-
sories after the fact, or participate in the commission or attempted
commission of an act of corruption, or conspire to commit any act
of corruption.264
Furthermore, the CPA requires public servants, including
police officers, customs officers, revenue officials, and procure-
ment officers, to submit a declaration of assets and liabilities.265
Such declarations are to be presented to the Corruption Preven-
tion Commission. 266 The Commission is responsible for investigat-
ing complaints of corruption based on the CPA.267 Finally, the
Commission is required to report any acts of corruption committed
by a public servant to the Director of Public Prosecutions for fur-
ther investigation. 26" However, declarations of assets, liabilities,
and income are not considered public documents.269
In January 2004, Jamaica's Access to Information Act (ATI)
entered into force.270 It applies to all government entities and
aims to provide transparency in government administration,
greater government accountability, and participation by civil soci-
257. Gladys Young, Crown Counsel, Questionnaire on Provisions Selected by the
Committee of Experts for Analysis within the Framework of the First Round, May 24,
2002, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/jam-resl.pdf [hereinafter
Jamaica's Response]; see also TI, THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM TI COUNTRY STUDY
REPORT: JAMAICA 2003 36-38, 46 (2003) [hereinafter TI, JAMAICA 2003].
258. Jamaican CPA, supra note 167, § 14(1).
259. Id. §§ 14(2), 14(10)-(12).
260. Id. § 14(8).
261. Id. § 14(4).
262. Id. §§ 14(5), 14(6).
263. Id. § 14(9).
264. Id. § 14(3).
265. Id. § 4(1).
266. Id. The Corruption Prevention Commission was launched on March 2003. It
has the authority to require any public servant to present sworn declaration of assets.
The Commission consists of the Auditor-General and four persons appointed by the
Governor-General. The appointed members serve for a period of seven years and may
be reappointed.
267. Id. § 5.
268. Id. § 12(2).
269. Id. § 4.
270. Jamaican ATI, supra note 168, § 2.
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ety in national decision-making.271 This law grants every person
the right of access to official documents not considered "exempt
documents,"27 2 creating an administrative proceeding when access
to information is denied.273 The Access to Information Unit meets
with the civil society in an ATI Committee of Stakeholders to iden-
tify strategies for the fulfillment of the Act's objectives.274
Jamaica is also part of multiple bilateral treaties on police
cooperation and general cooperation arrangements with various
countries. 25 Additionally, Jamaica is part of the Caribbean Com-
munity and the Commonwealth (CARICOM), which allows techni-
cal cooperation to prevent, detect, investigate, and punish acts of
corruption. 276  The Mutual Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act
allows cooperation with overseas law enforcement agencies in
investigations and proceedings related to criminal matters,
including acts of corruption. 277 The requesting country, however,
must be a State Party to the IACAC or a designated Common-
wealth country.
Assistance under the Criminal Matters Act includes, but is
not limited to gathering evidence and assisting investigations,
retaining dealings in property or freezing assets, and tracing,
seizure, and forfeiture of property. 27 Three governmental entities
are responsible for the Implementation of the Mutual Assistance
Act: the Minister of Justice, the Director of Public Prosecution,
and the Organized Crime Investigation Unit of the Jamaica Con-
stabulary Force. 279 The Director of Public Prosecution was dele-
gated by the Ministry of Justice as the Central Authority for
purposes of processing requests for assistance and cooperation
271. Jamaica's Response, supra note 227, at 19-22.
272. Honduras ATI, supra note 236, § 14-23. Exempt Documents include those
that contain information that would prejudice the security, defense or international
relations of Jamaica and those that would involve an unreasonable disclosure of
information relating the personal affairs of any person. See id.
273. Id. § 30-31 (providing for an internal review by the Public Authority if a
request for access is denied and appeals to an Appeals Tribunal established by the
Act).
274. Access to Information Unit, http://www.jis.gov.jm/special-sections/ATI/
default.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
275. Jamaica's Response, supra note 257, at 25-28. For example, Jamaica has
signed such treaties with Canada, Colombia, the United Kingdom, and United States.
See id.
276. Id. at 28.
277. Mutual Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act (1995) (Jam.), available at www.
oas.org/juridico/MLA/enij/anen-jam-mla-1995.html.
278. Jamaica's Response, supra note 257, at 25.
279. See Mutual Assistance Act, supra note 277; see also id. at 15.
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based in the IACAC.2 s°
D. Trinidad & Tobago
In April 1998, Trinidad & Tobago signed and ratified the
IACAC. 28' A 1987 "Prevention of Corruption Act," which criminal-
izes corrupt acts by public servants, high ranking officials of the
government, and State enterprises, was already in place.8 2 Fur-
thermore, in 2000, the Legislature issued the "Integrity in Public
Life Act '2 3 with the objective of strengthening the existing anti-
corruption legal regime and preventing illicit enrichment. The
Integrity Act created an Integrity Commission and a Code of Con-
duct.2 4 The Code of Conduct applies to persons in public life
25
and all "persons exercising public functions."286 This Code regu-
lates, among other things, the use of public office for private gain
or to influence decisions, the use of confidential information to fur-
ther private interest, the acceptance of fees, gifts and personal
benefits, and conflicts of interest. The Integrity Act does not
require any public officials or members of the public to report acts
of corruption and denunciations are made on a voluntary basis.287
Nonetheless, there is no effective legal protection for
whistleblowers.288
The Integrity Commission is responsible for investigating
280. Id.
281. See IACAC, supra note 8.
282. Prevention of Corruption Act (1987) (Trin. & Tobago); see also TI, THE
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM TI COUNTRY STUDY REPORT: TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 2001 15
(2001), available at http://wwl.transparency.org/activities/nat-integ-systems/dnld/
trinidad&tobago.pdf [hereinafter Trin. & Tobago Nat'l Integrity System]; Trin. &
Tobago, Update to the Questionnaire on Provisions Selected by the Committee of
Experts for Analysis Within the Framework of the First Round [hereinafter Trin. &
Tobago's Response], available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tto-resl.pdf.
283. Trin. & Tobago Integrity Act, supra note 161.
284. Id. at Parts II & VI.
285. Id. (defining "person[s] in public life" to include: Members of the House of
Representatives, Ministers of Government, Parliamentary Secretaries, Members of
the Tobago House of Assembly, Members of Municipalities, Members of Local
Government Authorities, Senators, Judges and Magistrates appointed by the Judicial
and Legal Service Commission, Members of the Boards of all Statutory Bodies and
State Enterprises, and Permanent Secretaries and Chief Technical Officers).
286. Id. § 2 (defining persons exercising public function as all persons holding office
under the Public Service, Judicial and Legislative Service, Police Service, Teaching
Service, Statutory Authorities' Service Commission, Members of the Diplomatic
Service, and Advisers to the Government).
287. Id. § 32(1).
288. TRIN. & TOBAGO TRANSPARENCY INST., INDEPENDENT AsSESSMENT OF THE
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO GOVERNMENT's RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS' FIRST
ROUND QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION
524 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:3
complaints related to breaches of the Integrity Act and the Pre-
vention of Corruption Act.28 9 It must report any breach of the
Code of Conduct to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the
Public Service Commission. 29" The Commission also receives and
examines declarations of assets and liabilities of public officials on
an annual basis.29' Furthermore, the Commission has authority to
conduct an investigation to determine whether assets, income,
and liabilities were fully disclosed in the declaration. 292 A princi-
ple objective of this provision is to deter and detect illicit enrich-
ment of public officials,293 an offence punishable by up to ten years
in prison.291 The Commission is also responsible for preparing a
Register of Interest, which are statements by persons in public life
regarding their sources of income and "any other substantial
interest" that may appear to raise a conflict between private inter-
est and public obligations.2 95 The Register of Interest is available
for public scrutiny in order to detect any conflict of interest.296
In February 2001, Trinidad & Tobago adopted the Freedom of
Information Act (FOI).297 The objective of the FOI is to promote
transparency and accountability in government affairs.298 It pro-
vides the public a right to access information possessed by public
authorities. 29 9 The FOI creates an administrative procedure in
case a public authority refuses to provide official documents.3 0
Three months after the FOI became effective, the Freedom of
AGAINST CORRUPrION 9 (2004), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tto-
res2.pdf [hereinafter THIN. & TOBAGO INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT].
289. Trin. & Tobago Integrity Act, supra note 161, § 5.
290. Id. pt. II, § 31. The Public Service Commission has the responsibility of
exercising disciplinary control over public officers. The procedure for allegation of
misconduct is stated in the Public Service Commission Regulation.
291. Id. pt. III, § 11.
292. Id. pt. III, § 21 ("[Any person who fails to declare or falsely declares it assets,
incomes, and liabilities is guilty of an offense and liable to imprisonment for up to ten
years.").
293. See Parliamentary Debates, Official Report in the Fourth Session of the Fifth
Parliament of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago, Sess. 1998-1999, vol. 16, www.
ttparliament.org/ hansard/senate/1999/hs990706.pdf; see also Trin. & Tobago
Integrity Act, supra note 161. According to § 12(5) of the Integrity Act, the person
filing the declaration of assets has the burden to proof the sources of income. Unjust
enrichment serves as a deterrent, since it's a presumed offense.
294. Trin. & Tobago Integrity Act, supra note 161, § 21.
295. Id. § 14(3).
296. Id. § 14(2).
297. Trin. & Tobago FOI, supra note 162. The Trin. & Tobago FOI was amended by
Act No. 92 in 2000 & Act No. 14 in 2003. See id.
298. Id. at 3.
299. Id. pt. III, § 11.
300. Id. at 12.
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Information Unit was created to monitor, advise, and issue
reports regarding compliance by the FOI public authorities.'O°
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 302 imple-
ments mutual assistance treaties in criminal matters and can
only be applied in relation to a request made by a foreign country
under a bilateral or multilateral agreement. This Act allows the
gathering of evidence for a criminal investigation or prosecution in
a foreign country, including restraining, seizure, or forfeiture of
property situated within the boundaries of the territory."3 The
Attorney General, with the assistance of the Counter Drug and
Crime Task Force, the Fraud Squad, or the Criminal Investigation
Division, carries out requests. The Attorney General is the central
authority for purposes of the IACAC and is responsible for receiv-
ing requests and coordinating mutual legal assistance and extra-
dition. Extradition is governed by the Extradition
(Commonwealth and Foreign Territories) Act, which was
amended in 2004 to include corruption as an extraditable
offence. 04 This complied with Articles VI and XIII of the IACAC.
VI. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRuPTION
A. The Data
The IACAC has been in force for over six years, longer than
any other anti-corruption treaty. It has been acclaimed as the
most comprehensive international anti-corruption agreement. 5
For that reason, determining the IACAC's effectiveness is essen-
tial. This article compares corruption perception since 1996 and
corruption as a risk for investment since 1994. In order to deter-
mine corruption perception levels, two well respected surveys that
employ similar methodology will be used: the Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Banks
Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS). The
301. Trin. & Tobago Freedom of Information Unit, http://www.foia.gov.tt (last
visited Apr. 3, 2007).
302. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (1997) (Trin. & Tobago), available
at http://www.ttparliament.org. This Act was amended by Act No.7 of 2001 & Act
No.14 of 2004.
303. Id.
304. Act to Amend the Extradition Commonwealth and Foreign Territories Act
(Trin. & Tobago), No. 12 (2004), available at http://www.ttparliament.orgbills/acts/
2004/a2004-12.pdf.
305. Boswell, supra note 72, at 134.
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International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) will be used to assess
risk levels.
1. Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index (CPI)
Transparency International (TI) is an international non-gov-
ernmental organization devoted to combating corruption. TI
focuses on anti-corruption prevention and reforming systems of
government, rather than exposing individual cases of corrup-
tion.36 TI is popular for its Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
30
which has been released annually since 1995.308 The CPI is con-
sidered a "poll-of-polls" 39 because it surveys businesspeople and
assessments of local and foreign country analysts.3 10 The index
focuses on corruption in the public sector, defining it as "the abuse
of public office for private gain."31' The CPI ranks countries in
terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist
among public officials and politicians.3 12  A perfect score is 10,
which indicates that there is no corruption, whereas a lower score
reflects the perception of high levels of corruption.
Corruption perception can change over time. The CPI pro-
vides an annual snapshot of the perception of corruption in the
eyes of business people and country analysts. Nonetheless, TI rec-
ognizes that annual trends for a specific country could be mislead-
ing because the index is the result of a compilation of data from
different sources.3 13 Thus, a perception change in the country's
performance could result from a change in methodology or availa-
306. About Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/aboutus
(last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
307. See id.
308. See Internet Center for Corruption Research [ICCRI, http://www.icgg.org/
corruption.cpi-olderindices_1995.htmt (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
309. Internet Ctr. for Corruption Res., 2004 CPI, http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi
_2004_data.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). The CPI 2004 draws on eighteen
different polls and surveys from twelve independent institutions.
310. Id.; see also Tina S0reide, Chr. Michelsen Inst., Estimating Corruption:
Comments on Available Data, in UTSTEIN ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CTR. REPORTS
(Dec. 2003), http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=88.
311. See About Transparency International, supra note 306.
312. Surveys are carried out among businesspeople and country analysts, including
residents of the countries analyzed in this article.
313. But see LAMBSDORFF, supra note 20, at 60 (suggesting that relative trends over
time can be determined with the CPI data). The study shows that the relative trend
for Guatemala since 1998 to 2002 depicts an increase in corruption perception. Id.
Contrarily, Honduras and Jamaica experienced a positive relative trend from 1998 to
2002, showing a decrease in corruption perception. Id.
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ble sources. 14 However, a year-to-year perception analysis in a
given country can be determined by the country's score to the
"extent that changes can be traced to a change in the assessments
provided by individual sources."315 A change can be perceived and
is therefore not a result of technical factors. For example, TI
found that, aside from technical factors, CPI scores for Jamaica
and Trinidad & Tobago decreased in 2004 relative to 2003.316
Nevertheless, a corruption perception comparison can be
made among countries for one specific time period. In 2004, for
example, Trinidad & Tobago was perceived as the least corrupt
among our four countries.3 17 The same proved to be true in 2001,
2002, and 2003.31" Trinidad & Tobago is followed by Jamaica in
2002, 2003, and 2004. Moreover, in 1998 and 1999, Jamaica still
reflects a better score than Guatemala and Honduras. Between
Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica, the latter is perceived as less
corrupt for three consecutive years (2002 to 2004). Between Gua-
temala and Honduras, TI perceives the former as less corrupt in
1998, 1999, 2001, and 2003. The opposite is true in 2002 and
2004.319
TABLE 1: CPI COUNTRY SCORE
32 0
Country 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004
Guatemala 3.1 3.2 2.9* 2.5 2.4 2.2
Honduras 1.7* 1.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3
Jamaica 3.8 3.8 N/A* 4.0 3.8 3.3
Trinidad & Tobago N/A* N/A 5.3 4.9 4.6 4.2
Note: * indicates year of ratification
314. Internet Center for Corruption Research Frequently Asked Questions, http:/
www.icgg.orgcorruption.cpi_2004_faq.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). The ICCR has
stated that "[elach year, some sources are not updated and must be dropped from the
CPI, while new, reliable sources are added. With differing respondents and slightly
differing methodologies, a change in a country's score may also relate to the fact that
different viewpoints have been collected and different questions been asked." Id.
315. The ICCR suggests using the country score, as opposed to its rank, when
making annual comparison. Id.
316. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Frequently Asked
Questions (CPI 2004), http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1538/7989/file/
q+a-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
317. See infra TABLE 1: CPI COUNTRY SCORE & TABLE 2: COUNTRY RANKING.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. Data was only partially available for the Caribbean states in these four years.
In 2000 and before 1998, CPI does not have available data for the four countries
analyzed in this article.
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TABLE 2: COUNTRIES' RANKING
6-
0
1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004
Score
1 EGuatemala O Honduras El Jamaica U Trinidad & Tobago
Until recently, the data illustrated that Trinidad & Tobago
and Jamaica were perceived as less corrupt than Guatemala and
Honduras between these four time periods. The data also indi-
cated that Honduras was perceived most frequently as being the
most corrupt, followed by Guatemala. These results are not suffi-
cient to determine whether the countries have improved or wors-
ened in perception of corruption over the years because the CPI
does not convey information about trends over time.3 21 Thus, Hon-
duras could be perceived as the most corrupt for four different
time periods, but it could also be the case that it has improved
considerably since the ratification of the IACAC. Therefore, data
that reflects trends along the years would be required to deter-
mine such changes (increase/decline). Data merely illustrating a
shift from one year to another is not sufficient. Even if Jamaica
and Trinidad & Tobago reflect an increased perception of corrup-
tion in one year, this result does not convey information about sys-
tematic change over time. For that reason, the indicator bellow
that shows trends over time will be used.
2. Governance Research Indicator Country
Snapshot (GRICS)
The World Bank provides a database with estimates of six
governance indictors, including "Control of Corruption," for four
time periods (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002).22 The indicators are
321. TI, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 2001, supra note 282. TI reiterates that "CPI is not
designated to provide for comparisons over time, since each year the surveys included
in the index vary." Id. See also Soreide, supra note 310, at 8.
322. The six governance indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and
[Vol. 38:3528
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drawn from twenty-five separate data sources constructed by
eighteen different organizations.3 2 3 "Control of Corruption" mea-
sures perceptions of corruption, defined as the exercise of public
power for private gain.324 Point estimates (PE) range between -2.5
and 2.5, with higher value implying better outcomes. This range
in the PEs is a result of the methodology used by the experts.2 5
The information is also expressed in percentile ranking (PR)
from 0 to 100, which indicates the percentage of countries world-
wide that are rated below a given country, with higher values
implying better corruption ratings.3 26 Like CPI, GRICS is a "poll-
of-polls." An important difference between these two sets of
databases is that the latter provides information about the per-
formance of a country over time.327 The control of the corruption
PEs and PRs for the examined countries are represented in the
table below.
control of corruption. See GRICS, Questions and Answers, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/kkz2002/q&a.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
323. See Kaufmann, supra note 2, at 2-7. The 2002 indicators used 250 individual
measures, taken from twenty-five different sources, which were produced by eighteen
different organizations. Id. The control of corruption index was based on fourteen
distinct sources, using data from 2002. Id. TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is
not used as source because it is in itself an aggregate of a number of individual
sources that are already included in the corruption indicator. Id.
324. This definition covers a broad range of acts of corruption. For purposes of the
study, corruption is considered as demonstrator of a failure of governance.
325. GRICS, Questions and Answers, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
kkz2002/q&a.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). The experts explain: "We use
Unobserved Component Model (UCM) to aggregate the various response in the broad
6 clusters. This model treats the 'true' level of governance in each country as
unobserved, and assumes that each of the available sources for a country provide
noisy "signals" of the level of governance. T he UCM then constructs a weighted
average of the sources for each country as the best estimate of governance for that
country. The weights are proportional to the reliability of each source. The resulting
estimates of governance have an expected value (across countries) of zero, and a
standard deviation (across countries) of one. This implies that virtually all scores lie
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes." Id.
See also Kaufmann, supra note 2, at 8-12.
326. The best quartile is over seventy-fifth percentile, the second best is over
fiftieth, the third is over twenty-fifth, and the fourth quartile is bellow twenty-fifth.
327. Kaufmann, supra note 2, at 11.
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TABLE 3: GRICS CONTROL OF CORRUPTION
Country Mode 1996 1998 2000 2002
Guatemala PE -0.90 -0.71 -0.66 -0.71
PR 18.0 23.5 29.3 30.9
Honduras PE -0.90 -0.72 -0.67 -0.78
PR 17.3 21.9 28.3 27.3
Jamaica PE -0.31 -0.26 -0.20 -0.46
PR 40.7 55.7 53.3 39.2
PE +0.31 +0.13 +0.36 -0.04
PR 65.3 69.4 71.7 57.2
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This data sheds new light on the ranking among the four
countries over four time periods. Using the PR, the data confirms
CPI's results in three of the four time periods. 328 Trinidad &
Tobago was considered the least corrupt among the four countries
in 2002, and Jamaica had the same result over Honduras and
Guatemala in 1998. However, in 2002, Honduras was perceived
as more corrupt compared to Guatemala.329 Finally, the data
reflects that from 1996 to 2002, Trinidad & Tobago was perceived
as the least corrupt, followed by Jamaica, Guatemala, and Hondu-
ras, the latter of which was perceived as the most corrupt.
328. See supra TABLE 3: GRICS CONTROL OF CORRUPTION & TABLE 4: COUNTRIES'
RANKING.
329. CPI data illustrates that Honduras had a better score in 2002 than
Guatemala. See ICCR, CPI 2002, http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi-2002_data.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
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More importantly, using the PE of corruption control, the
data can indicate whether there was any degree of improvement
in corruption perception between 1996 and 2004. Four major
assessments can be made with the available data. First, because
Honduras and Trinidad & Tobago ratified the IACAC in 1998, the
data could reflect any change of perception since ratification. Sec-
ond, Guatemala and Jamaica ratified the IACAC in 2001; there-
fore the data could show corruption perception before ratification
and change in 2002 compared to 2000. Third, as reflected above,
Guatemala and Honduras are countries with similar characteris-
tics. The data could illustrate improvement of corruption percep-
tion among the countries and determine whether the time of
ratification could be a factor of change (improvement/decline). The
same assessment can be made regarding Jamaica and Trinidad &
Tobago. °
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Trinidad & Tobago had a corruption perception point esti-
mate of 0.31 in 1996, with a drop in corruption perception in 1998
(0.13), the IACAC's ratification year. Two years after the IACAC
ratification, Trinidad & Tobago's low perception of corruption
reached its highest peak of 0.36. This is the same year when the
Integrity Act became effective to implement the terms of the
IACAC. In 2001, the Freedom of Information Act was adopted.
However, in 2002, an extreme drop is reflected, leaving the coun-
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try at its lowest point estimate for the first time in the four time
periods (-0.04).
Honduras' performance was not as unstable as Trinidad &
Tobago's, although in the last term, it experienced a drop in rela-
tion to the previous two-time periods. In 1996, Honduras's point
estimate was -0.9, but it improved to -0.72 in 1998, the IACAS
ratification year. Between 1998 and 2000, Honduras experienced
a peak of low corruption perception (-0.67). However, in 2002,
that perception increased to -0.78. This occurred despite the fact
that 2002 was the year of major anti-corruption reforms in Hondu-
ras, including the adoption of the new Code of Criminal procedure
and the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Accounts.3 '
Jamaica's performance was similar to Trinidad & Tobago's
where in 2002, corruption perception increased considerably.
Jamaica experienced a steady positive trend of reducing corrup-
tion perception from 1996 until 2000. Although Jamaica ratified
the IACAC in 2001 and adopted anti-corruption legislation (Cor-
ruption Prevention Act and Access to Information Act) in 2002,332
2002 was nonetheless the worst corruption perception year (-0.46)
of the previous four time periods reported.
Guatemala's performance was similar to Honduras's. The
data reflects an improvement in corruption perception for these
two countries between 1996 and 2000. Like Jamaica, Guatemala
ratified the IACAC in 2001 and adopted anti-corruption measures
in 2002 (Law on Probity and Anti-Corruption Commission).333 Yet,
in contrast to Jamaica's performance, Guatemala did not experi-
ence a tremendous increase in corruption perception in 2002,
although it did increase slightly from -0.66 to -0.71.
Guatemala experienced the least amount of change in 2002,
followed by Honduras and Jamaica. Trinidad & Tobago was the
country that experienced the most change between 1996 and
2002."'4 This data reflects that the experience of the two Central
American countries is similar to that of both Caribbean states
that experienced a significant increase in corruption perception in
2002. This negative perception of corruption among the public in
Jamaica is best explained by the fact that between 2000 and 2002,
331. See Honduras Criminal Procedure Code, supra note 244; see also discussion
supra at Part V.A. (Honduras).
332. See CPA supra 256, see also ATI supra note 270; discussion supra at Part V.C.
(Jamaica).
333. See Guatemalan Law on Probity, supra note 165.
334. See infra TABLE 6: JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD& & TOBAGO'S PERFORMANCE.
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there was extensive media exposure of corrupt practices connected
to the ruling Peoples National Party.335
Moreover, at the beginning of 2002, the Jamaica's Opposition
Party announced the launch of an anti-corruption campaign
against the Peoples National Party.336 Similarly, the increase in
corruption perception in Trinidad & Tobago may be influenced by
corruption scandals related to spending public funds or procure-
ment contracts. For example, a 2001 assessment of corruption in
Trinidad & Tobago stated that there was "growing public concern
on the uses of pubic funds" including the construction contract for
the Piarco Airport terminal.337 Furthermore, Transparency Inter-
national reports that the Piarco Airpot corruption controversy
lead to the collapse of the government in 2001 and the subsequent
election of a new government. 8 Thus, the widely publicized cor-
ruption scandals in the Caribbean countries had a negative
impact on corruption perception. 9
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335. TI, JAMAICA 2003, supra note 257, at 22, 34 ("Charges have been made that
tens of millions of dollars of public contracts have been corruptly awarded to
contractors connected to the ruling Peoples National Party and that huge sums of
money have peen paid for work not done.., massive media coverage aroused public
disquiet.").
336. TI, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: 2003, 94 (2003), http://www.transparency.
org/publications/gcr/downloadgcr/downloadgcr_2003.
337. TI, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 2001, supra note 282, at 13-4.
338. See id. at 97 ("The controversy over the appropriate responses to the charges
essentially led to the collapse of the government.").
339. See id. at 100.
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Certainly, the data reflects that the ratification date of the
IACAC did not improve corruption perception among citizens,
experts, and enterprises in the respective countries. Moreover, the
results from CPI and GRICS suggest that corruption perception
has worsened since 2000. Nevertheless, important steps to combat
corruption have been adopted by the counties in order to imple-
ment the terms of the IACAC. Anti-corruption measures were
adopted during and after 2002, including a criminal system
reform in Honduras, Guatemala's Law on Probity Mechanism,
and Jamaica's Corruption Prevention Act Commission. Addition-
ally, Trinidad & Tobago's Freedom of Information Act has only
been in place since 2001. In this respect, in order to reach conclu-
sions about the effectiveness of the IACAC, it is necessary to
assess changes in perception after 2002. Even though the ratifica-
tion of the IACAC has not resulted in immediate positive changes
in perception, these implementations may result in an improve-
ment over a longer period of time.
3. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
The Political Risk Group has g6nerated the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) since 1982. The ICRG provides infor-
mation about political risks in developed and developing coun-
tries. Its assessments are based on the analysis of a worldwide
network of experts. Corruption, a component of the Political Risk
Index,34 ° measures corruption within the political system. The
type of corruption considered is that which "is a threat to foreign
investment by distorting the economic and financial environment,
reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling
people to assume positions of power through patronage rather
than ability, and introducing inherent instability in the political
system."34' The Risk Guide assigned a risk point ranging from 0
(higher risk) - 6 (lower risk). Thus, the highest number of points
(6) indicates the lowest potential risk of corruption and the lowest
number (0) indicates the highest potential risk. 42
The data does not provide information regarding corruption
perception. Instead, the risk-points reflect the comparative risks
340. The Political Risk rating includes twelve weighted variables covering political
and social attributes. See PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide, http://www.
prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
341. Id.
342. Id. A Political Risk rating of 0 to 2.994 indicates a very high risk (3 to 3.594 is
high risk; 3.6 to 4.194 is moderate risk; 4.2 to 4.794 is low risk; and 4.8 to 5 is very low
risk).
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of investing in a country. The ICRG is different from the CPI and
the GRICS because it is not a "poll-of-polls" about corruption per-
ception. However, the data can illustrate whether there has been
any improvement towards a more investor-friendly environment
in the last ten years.
The data helps to answer two questions: 1) Has ratification of
the IACAC lowered the risk for investors in a certain country? 2)
If not, are implemented measures improving the environment for
investors? Note that recent anti-corruption measures by Guate-
mala, Honduras, and Jamaica could affect change in the risk rat-
ing. The information regarding the selected countries is shown in
the table below.
TABLE 7: ICRG CORRUPTION RISK
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Guatemala 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 3.83* 1.83 1.5 1.5
Honduras 2 2 2 2 2* 2 2 1.91 2.41 2.5 2.41
Jamaica 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.83 2* 1.91 1.5 1.5
Trinidad & Tobago 3 3 3 3 3 3* 3 3 2.58 2 2
Note: * indicates year of ratification.
As the data illustrates, Guatemala experienced a risk rate of
2 during the first two years, and improved by one point in 1996
and another point in 1997, thus maintaining a constant risk point
of four for three years. After 2000, however, the risk of invest-
ment increased considerably from 4 risk points in 2000 to 1.5 in
2004. This illustrates that neither ratification nor implementing
anti-corruption measures lowered the risk to investors.
Honduras experienced a stable risk point of 2 for seven years
(1994-2000). Like Guatemala, though, it experienced a drop in
2001. In 2002, however, Honduras had a leap of 0.5 points, the
greatest of the decade. Since then, and for the first time, Hondu-
ras is perceived as more investor-friendly than Guatemala. A
small decrease is noticed in 2004, from 2.5 to 2.41. The significant
change in 2002 may be the result of the aggressive anti-corruption
measures taken by the government, mainly the reformation of the
criminal justice system, the anti-immunity constitutional amend-
ments, and the establishment of the Supreme Court of Accounts. 43
The ratification of the IACAC did not seem to have any impact on
the investment environment Honduras.
343. See discussion supra at Part V (Honduras).
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Jamaica ratified the IACAC in 2001. Despite the treaty's rati-
fication, investor risk has been increasing steadily since 2000.
The implemented measures did not seem to improve investor risk.
The same is true for Trinidad & Tobago, which experienced a con-
stant drop since 2002. Similar to Honduras, Jamaica had a risk
point of 3 for eight years. Thus, the IACAC's ratification date did
not seem have any impact (improving/worsening) on investor risk
points.
The data makes clear that all four countries have suffered an
increase in investor risk. Jamaica has experienced increased risk
since 2000, followed by Guatemala in 2001, and Trinidad &
Tobago in 2002. Only Honduras has proven to be resistant to that
trend, although that conclusion is not certain because 2004 shows
a slight drop." In 2004, Honduras was perceived as having the
lowest risk (2.41), followed by Trinidad & Tobago (2), and finally
Guatemala and Jamaica (1.5).
TABLE 8: 2000-2004 COUNTRIES' PERFORMANCE
4.5 -
3.5
1 2.5 "" 40 -------
1.5 ___--_
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
-<-- Guatemala - - Honduras -- &-- Jamaica --- Trinidad & Tobago]
Corruption perception estimates (GRICS) and investor risk
points (ICRS) seem to move in the opposite direction in the case of
Honduras because this country reflects an improvement in risk
points in 2002, but in that same year a decrease in perception is
reflected. On the other hand, Trinidad & Tobago has been consid-
ered the least corrupt since 1996-2002 by a wide margin. Nonethe-
less, Guatemala was the highest risk point of all the countries
from 1997 until 2001, not Trinidad & Tobago. 45
344. See infra TABLE 8: 2000-2004 COUNTRIES' PERFORMANCE.
345. See id.
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B. Country Specific Causes of Corruption
Corruption in Latin America is widespread, but the degree of
the problem varies from country to country.34 However, available
data provides information about the extent of the problem in the
examined countries. The data illustrates three primary conclu-
sions. First, neither the ratification date of the IACAC nor imple-
mented anti-corruption measures seem to have improved
corruption perception in the time period reflected (1996-2002).
Second, the ratification date does not seem to decrease corruption
perceived as a risk to investment.3 47 Third, corruption perception
and risk levels are not necessarily correlated.
In sum, corruption perception in these countries is not
improving, thus making it essential to examine the cause of this
346. Norma Parker et al., Corruption in Latin America: A Desk Assessment, in
AMERICAS' ACCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION PROJECT (2004), http://www.u4.no/
document/showdoc.cfm?id=96.
347. Honduras was the only country where anti-corruption measures seemed to
influence a change in risk levels.
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trend. Generally, an increase in corruption perception is a result
of widespread opportunity to engage in corrupt practices and
impunity, whereas a low risk of being subject to investigation and
prosecution. 4 s Corrupt officials do not perceive prosecution as a
credible threat; therefore consequences for illicit behavior are low
or nonexistent for all actors. 49 Thus, in order to provide accurate
recommendations to tackle the problem, an assessment of the
foundational causes of corruption is necessary. °
In 2002, the World Bank conducted a country diagnostics to
determine the causes of corruption in Honduras. 5' The Honduran
study concluded that highly politicized executive and judicial
branches of government primarily cause corruption; namely the
auditor bodies, the courts, the police, the customs officers, the
political parties, the municipal government, and even the
National Autonomous University. 52 This diagnostic specifically
concluded that the judicial branch is perceived as the most dishon-
est and inefficient government institution most likely to be subject
to state capture. 53
The World Bank also conducted a preliminary diagnostic for
Guatemala in 1997.1"4 Its assessment stressed that thirty-six
years of civil war in Guatemala created mistrust in its political
institutions, principally the judicial branch, which is perceived as
a tool of corruption. 5 Long-term military control has left a cul-
ture of impunity, secrecy, and non-transparency in government
practices, principally the auditor bodies, the justice system, the
customs office, and the police. 56 Political and military power ena-
bled the accumulation of fortunes by high-ranking officials, thus
348. United Nations Development Program [UNDP], Corruption and Good
Governance 51 (Discussion Paper No. 3, 1997), available at http://www.undp.org/
oslocentre/PARBergen_2002/corruption3.htm; see also LAMBSDORFF, supra note 20,
at 153.
349. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 665, 686 (2004); see also Parker, supra
note 346, at 5.
350. ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION, supra note 54, at 58.
351. TUGRUL GURGUR ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, PRELIMINARY DRAFT REPORT:
GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN HONDURAS: AN INPUT FOR ACTION PLANNING
(2002), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206690/
hon%5Fgac.pdf.
352. Id. at 9.
353. Id.
354. Maria Gonzalez de Asis, Borrador Guatemala Reforma Judicial y Corrupci6n
[Draft Guatemala Judicial Reform and Corruption] (Oct. 1998), http://www.
worldbank.org/wbi/governance/guatemala/pdf/guat-judrefcorr.pdf.
355. Id. at 5.
356. Edelberto Torres, Accion Cuidadana, El Sistema Nacional de Integridad en
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making public office an avenue for personal gain.857 Deficient and
ineffective institutions are an essential factor that furthers cor-
ruption in the Guatemala, deepening the culture of impunity."'
The Caribbean states also experienced an increase in opportu-
nities to engage in corrupt practices. Jamaica's strategic geo-
graphic location as a cocaine supply route, in addition to low
wages for public officials, inadequate internal control in govern-
ment institutions, and ineffective law enforcement in corruption
related offences. This creates an environment that facilitates cor-
rupt practices. 5 Moreover, political traditions of patron-client
relations in Trinidad & Tobago, as well as a rise in economic activ-
ity and growth, increased opportunities to engage in corrupt prac-
tices. 6 ° Trinidad & Tobago's press and private sector have
increasingly reported allegations of corruption involving govern-
ment contracts361
The fact that corruption perception has increased in these
countries does not necessarily mean that the IACAC is failing to
influence changes in behavior within the countries. Corruption is
a pandemic, deeply rooted in a country's historical, social, eco-
nomic, and institutional situation.62 The IACAC constitutes an
important step in the fight against corruption, but it is only part of
a systematic approach against the problem. 63 It is a symbol of
consensus among countries in the Western Hemisphere and a
legal framework to harmonize laws to establish an anti-corruption
network. In the countries analyzed within this article, the IACAC
has served as the basis to revise, update and enact new anti-cor-
ruption legislation.
In every IACAC State Party, the "Acts of Corruption" listed in
Guatemala [The National Integrity System in Guatemala], TI (2001), at 11, available
at http://www.transparency.org/contentdownload/1650/8371/file/guatemala.pdf.
357. TI, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 2001, supra note 282, at 198.
358. TI, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: 2001 155 (Robin Hodess et al. eds., 2001),
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download-gcr/download-
gcr_2001.
359. TI, JAMAICA 2003, supra note 257, at 8.
360. U.S. STATE DEPT., 2005 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT: TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
(2005), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ ifd/2005/43041.htm.
361. For example, allegations of corruption led the Trinidad & Tobago Government
to investigate construction projects of the Biche High School and a terminal building
of the Piarco Airport. See TI, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 2001, supra note 282, at 32; see also
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: 2003, supra note 336, at 97.
362. Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International
Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 67, 70 (2001).
363. Carrefio, supra note 84, at 21.
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Article VI are punishable offenses .3  Furthermore, State Parties
have demonstrated a willingness to comply with non-compulsory
provisions of the IACAC, such as article IX on illicit enrichment
and article VIII on transnational bribery.36 Another accomplish-
ment of the IACAC is the inclusion of corruption as an
addressable problem on the regional agenda. 66 After the treaty's
adoption, there has been a clear increase in public awareness of
the problem. Corruption by its very nature is a secret practice. A
decade ago, corruption was not even considered an issue that
should be addressed by a regional agenda. Rather, corruption was
perceived as more of a cultural trait.367
Each of the four countries analyzed in this article have widely
and openly discussed the problem of corruption. Moreover, the
media has played an important role in reporting corruption cases
and raising awareness about the nature and the scope of the prob-
lem. As a result, the public is now informed of the problem and is
increasingly demanding greater government accountability and
transparency.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A culture of impunity and non-transparency in government
administration is deeply rooted in these analyzed countries.
Therefore, corruption must be addressed through a systematic,
multidimensional approach, emphasizing both prevention and law
enforcement.3 68 A successful anti-corruption strategy must be
tackled with substantial national reforms and multilateral sup-
port. Because the IACAC and its Follow-up Mechanism are part
of the integrated strategy to fight corruption, two modifications
are suggested to increase its positive impact. First, the Follow-up
Mechanism should be strengthened. Second, international cooper-
ation should be used to assist these countries in building their
technical capacities to investigate corruption and to recover assets
proceeding from corrupt practices. However, "[t] here are no quick
fixes" to eliminating corruption.3 69 Current anti-corruption strate-
gies may not show positive results for one or even two genera-
364. See IACAC, supra note 8, art. IX.
365. For example, Honduras and Jamaica have both criminalized illicit
enrichment, and Guatemala has a law initiative with that objective.
366. Parker, supra note 346, at 4.
367. Id. at 12.
368. Id. at 13.
369. Id. at 20.
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tions.170 Because of public awareness of the problem and the
skepticism of government anti-corruption action, regaining the
public's confidence becomes a long-term commitment.3 71 Nonethe-
less, the Follow-up Mechanism, if strengthened, can play a signifi-
cant role in decreasing corruption perception in the future.
A. Strengthening the Follow- Up Mechanism
The first step in the fight against corruption is the develop-
ment of a legal and institutional framework. Because the IACAC
constitutes the international framework to harmonize legislation,
the Follow-up Mechanism is an important tool to influence the
development of adequate legal and institutional frameworks. The
Follow-up Mechanism implements the IACAC by monitoring and
assisting national government in putting the IACAC into prac-
tice. 72 The literature reviewed draws attention to structural
problems that retard the Follow-up Mechanism, including issues
such as time-consuming processes, the lack of expertise in the
Committee of Experts, and the lack of sufficient resources within
the OAS General Secretariat.373 In this respect, it is fundamental
to solve these structural problems to create a more effective mech-
anism to implement the IACAC. Thus, it is necessary to accelerate
the rounds of analysis; regulate the appointment and composition
of the Committee of Experts; and create a permanent technical
secretariat with an adequate budget and technically qualified per-
sonnel. These recommendations are discussed below.
First, the examined countries have implemented the IACAC
by enacting new legislation and reforming existing laws. Because
corruption increases with the complexity of the regulatory system
and decreases with the clarity of the legal system, the Committee
of Experts is in a position to enhance the clarity of the anti-corrup-
tion legislation in the hemisphere.374 In this respect, the Follow-
up Mechanism should expedite the rounds analysis of national
anti-corruption legislation. The first round of analysis is mainly
concerned with a small number of provisions.37 In its first year,
370. Id. at 15.
371. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], UNODC Priorities of the Provisions
of Technical Assistance: Global Programme Against Corruption, http://www.unodc.
org/pdf/crime/corruption/corruption-gpac-strategyjul04.pdf.
372. VICTOR, supra note 17, at 15-17.
373. See Parker, supra note 346, at 40; De Michele, supra note 117, at 314.
374. LAMBSDORFF, supra note 20, at 59; see also discussion supra at Part II.
375. Conference of State Parties' Rules of Procedure, supra note 121, arts. III 1, 2,
4, 9, 11, XIV, XVIII, at 3-4.
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the Committee of Experts only reviewed one State Party.376 The
Conference of State Parties noted the problem in 2004 and
requested the acceleration of the process by increasing the
examined State Parties to twelve per year and increasing the
number of annual meetings to three. 77 Following these recom-
mendations, the Committee issued a timetable to allow the review
of twelve State Parties per year.378 As of March 2005, only eigh-
teen members were reviewed, despite the fact that every country
had submitted a reply to the questionnaire.379 Moreover, because
the country reports were not be published until the end of the first
round, the countries that did not accede to its publication have a
lengthy 'grace period' during which they will not receive external
pressure to comply with the experts' recommendations. 380 There-
fore, the Committee should review a greater number of provisions
in the next rounds of analysis.
Second, the existing Rules of Procedure should be amended to
specify technical qualification requirements to be met by the
appointees to the Committee of Experts. The Rules of Procedure
should also specifically indicate the duration of the appointment.
As noted supra, the Committee of Experts is responsible for an
analytical assessment of the questionnaires to determine the ade-
quacy of national anti-corruption legislation. 8 Currently, the
Follow-up Mechanism does not specify technical prerequisites for
the candidates appointed to the Committee of Experts. The Rules
of Procedure only require a government appointment. 2 Thus,
there is doubt that the persons conducting the reviews have the
necessary technical expertise and incentives to effectively monitor
the implementation of the IACAC.
In addition to the disparity in legal and analytical skills
among the experts, there is a high probability that the appoint-
ments are based solely on political considerations and not on
merit. 3 The lack of regulation causes the process to lose credibil-
ity by slowing down the rounds, and potentially lowers the quality
376. De Michele, supra note 117, at 313. Argentina was the first State Party to be
reviewed.
377. OAS, Conclusions and Recommendations on Concrete Measures to Strengthen
MESICIC, SG/MESICIC/doc.103/04 rev.6, § III (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.oas.org/
juridico/Englishlfollowup-conf concl.pdf.
378. Methodology, supra note 119.
379. Parker, supra note 346, at 40.
380. See supra notes 12, 118 and accompanying text.
381. See discussion supra at Part III.B.
382. Conference of State Parties' Rules of Procedure, supra note 121, art. 2.
383. De Michele, supra note 117, at 314.
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of the Final Country Reports. Moreover, it creates an excessive
burden on those experts that do have legal and analytical exper-
tise."4 This undue burden is reflected particularly in cases where
civil society fails to present "shadow reports" and the experts must
research independent sources of information. Hence, the Rules of
Procedure should be revised to require the candidates to provide
evidence of sufficient analytical and technical expertise. On the
other hand, the Rules of Procedure should be amended to deter-
mine the duration of the appointment to ensure greater levels of
independence from government. For example, the candidates
could serve for a term of two years (the proposed duration of a
round). The terms should be staggered to ensure that not all the
experts begin and complete the term at the same time. In this
respect, the experts could enjoy a higher degree of independence
vis-A-vis their governments.
Third, the Follow-up Mechanism requires sufficient financial
resources to maintain a permanent technical secretariat. 8 Cur-
rently, the OAS General Secretariat serves as the Technical Sec-
retariat for the Follow-up Mechanism.31 6 The OAS Secretariat,
which has limited resources and personnel, is not completely dedi-
cated to the Follow-up Mechanism. The lack of personnel and ade-
quate funding is an obstacle to achieving the Mechanism's
objectives. According to the Rules of Procedure, the secretariat is
responsible for carrying out a significant amount of work, includ-
ing the preparation of draft methodology and questionnaires, pre-
liminary country reports, and research papers or studies on topics
related to the Committee's responsibilities87
Because there is lack of personnel and the degree of responsi-
bility is substantial, the Follow-up Mechanism should have a per-
manent technical secretariat with adequate personnel and
funding. Thus, with a separate secretariat, the rounds could be
accelerated to enable the review of sixteen countries annually,
given that distributing the amount of work makes it more man-
ageable. Moreover, the high quality of the final country reports
can be maintained, even if there are a great number of State Par-
ties examined per session. Article 8 of the Rules of Procedure
should be amended to create a separate permanent technical sec-
retariat for the Follow-up Mechanism within the organizational
384. Id.
385. De Michele, supra note 117, at 313.
386. Reporto f Buenos Aires, supra note 114, art. 8.
387. Id. art. 9.
543
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:3
structure of the OAS General Secretariat. 88 Ultimately, the Con-
ference of State Parties and the international community should
ensure adequate funding to this pillar of the Mechanism.
Finally, it is important to note that the Follow-up Mechanism
has revised the Rules of Procedure to provide greater civil society
participation in the process."' Civil society is allowed to present
"shadow reports" and participate in its meetings. This is an
important reform since civil society now has regular opportunities
to become an alternative source of information, especially when
governments fail to develop or disclose sufficient information.
Civil society's effective participation in the process will facilitate
and reinforce the analysis of a country's particular situation. For
example, the Honduras Final Report was solely made with the
information provided by the government because civil society did
not present a "shadow report." In this report, the Committee noted
in more than five occasions that it had insufficient information to
make a comprehensible assessment about the actual effects of the
laws.39°
B. Building Enforcement Networks
The Follow-up Mechanism promotes the identification and
implementation of public policies to prevent corruption and
increase transparency, but by itself it will not reduce corruption. 91
Additionally, the mere enactment of preventative legislation is
insufficient. Indeed, "[I]aws cannot completely address corruption
embedded in a nation, its institutions, and its social system."392
Reforms at the national level are necessary to prevent and reduce
corruption. National reforms can include the establishment of an
independent anti-corruption agency or a national focal point to
facilitate the exchange of good practices within a region. All coun-
tries examined in this article produced information about the
institutions to be considered as Central Authority to render and
solicit cooperation and technical assistance. 93
However, in most cases, these agencies lack the financial
resources, technical expertise, and incentives to conduct complex
388. Id. § 5 ("Secretariat services for the mechanism shall be provided by the
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.").
389. Id. art. 35.
390. Republic of Honduras, supra note 220.
391. Parker, supra note 346, at 40.
392. Steven R. Salbu, Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and
Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 679 (2000).
393. See discussion supra at Part V.
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investigations and prosecutions. In this respect, the international
community can cooperate by strengthening these institutions.
Assistance can be rendered by training the personnel or by giving
incentives for the personnel to acquire expertise.
For example, regional workshops, conferences, and meetings of
prosecutors and investigators are a good source of training. At the
same time, these activities are good incentives for those prosecu-
tors and investigators to acquire more expertise and good prac-
tices. The exchange of good practices and information is fluid
when there is a close network of prosecutors and investigators.
Thus, once a close network of enforcement agencies is created,
regional safe havens for corruption are likely to decrease.394
On the other hand, these enforcement institutions must be
independent from political influence. The country's citizens, its
media, and the civil society could serve as "watchdog" organiza-
tions to reveal unexplained tardiness, inaction, or inefficiency.
Freedom of the press is an indispensable right that must be
assured and protected by the courts. Complementary legislation
that protects whistleblowers is also essential.
C. Other Recommendations
It is important to note other measures that experts have rec-
ommended for stronger anti-corruption strategies, including
increased participation by civil society and increased judicial inde-
pendence. For example, the World Bank recommends more active
participation from civil society as part of the integrated strategy
to fight corruption. 95 TI has also emphasized the need for civil
society's participation in the Follow-up Mechanism.396
Moreover, a specific study on the role of civil society in the
Follow-up Mechanism recommends, among other things, training
394. Parker, supra note 346, at 52.
395. Multi-pronged Strategies for Combating Corruption, Civil Society
Participation, THE WORLD BANK, http://nwebl8.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/
Attachments/Anticorruption4/$File/chapter4.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007), at 6; see
also ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION, supra note 54, at 44; Rick Stapenhurst, The
Media's Role in Curbing Corruption, WORLD BANK INST. 20 (2000), http://www.
worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/media.pdf.
396. Corruption Fighters' Toolkit, Civil Society Experiences and Emerging
Strategies (2002-2003), TI (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.transparency.org/
tools/etoolkitlcorruption-fighters tool kit2002. See generally Jeremy Pope, TI
SOURCE BOOK 2000, CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL
INTEGRITY SYSTEM 129 (2000), available at www.transparency.org/sourcebook/
index.html.
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the organizations to provide high quality assessments. 397  The
study also recommends greater levels of publicity and media cov-
erage of the Final Country Reports, including the distribution of
the reports to other regional organizations and the international
donor community. 9
The U.N.'s Anti-Corruption Toolkit states that an accessible,
efficient and independent judiciary system is vital for the success
of anti-corruption efforts. 99 Political willpower to adopt new anti-
corruption legislation is clearly not enough to deter, detect, and
punish corrupt practices. Until corruption cases are brought to
courts and the rule of law is enforced, corrupt activities will con-
tinue unabated. The four countries examined in this article have
all passed new anti-corruption legislation to strengthen the
national anti-corruption legal regime.
However, the judiciary must be fully independent to uphold
the anti-corruption laws. If a judicial system is infected by corrup-
tion, it must be rebuilt to inspire public confidence. 00 In this
respect, the adoption and application of a judicial code of conduct
is a basic necessity.401 A law that regulates the selection, continu-
ing training, and appointment of judges is also advisable. Internal
legal regulations within the judicial system must prevent the
selection of political appointees, incompetent judges, or persons
with a history of corrupt practices.4 2 Judges should also present
on an annual basis declarations of assets and incomes, which
would be reviewed by an auditing mechanism.4 °3 In conclusion, a
monitoring system or "judicial watchdog" is essential to determine
the compliance of internal laws. On the other hand, judges should
also be protected from threats, intimidation, or attacks, especially
from organized criminal groups.40 4
397. Roberto de Michele, Technical Assistance Module - Citizens Participation in
the Follow-up of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, AMERICAS'
AcCOUNTABILITY ANTI-CORRUPTION PROJECT 23 (2004), http://www.casals.com/
documents/tams/DeMicheleTAM.pdf.
398. Id.
399. UNODC, The Global Programme Against Corruption, UN Anti-Corruption
Toolkit 110 (Sept. 2004), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption-toolkit.html
[hereinafter UNODC Toolkit].
400. Id. at 110.
401. Id. at 112.
402. Pope, supra note 396, at 67.
403. UNODC Toolkit, supra note 399, at 114.
404. Id. at 115.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption has been
acclaimed as the world's most comprehensive anti-corruption
treaty. The IACAC's Follow-up Mechanism has been in place
since 2001, and is currently analyzing the measures implemented
by the State Parties.4 °5 Despite this fact, the available data
reflects that the ratified IACAC has not improved corruption per-
ception, nor lowered corruption risk levels.
It is clear that the IACAC has influenced the adoption of new
legislation in Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad &
Tobago. Nonetheless, the available data demonstrates that imple-
mented measures have failed to improve the perception of corrup-
tion of these countries. The success of anti-corruption strategies
depends on a number of factors including political will and com-
mitment from national leaders, transparency and access to infor-
mation, and an independent judicial system. The Follow-up
Mechanism should be strengthened, however, to become a tool
that harmonizes anti-corruption legislation to eventually reduce
the negative perception of corruption. Finally, the international
community should support the State Parties to strengthen
enforcement institutions a2nd make corruption a high-risk
activity.
405. See OAS Follow-up Mechanism, supra note 10.
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